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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004, Kenneth Marsh walked out of state prison a free man for the 
first time in twenty-one years.1  In 1983, a two-year-old boy died while
in Marsh’s care.2  When a hospital pathologist concluded in the boy’s 
autopsy report that his death was a homicide caused by head injuries, the
State prosecuted Marsh.3  A jury subsequently convicted Marsh of
second-degree murder and sentenced him to fifteen years to life in
prison.4  Marsh maintained, through an unsuccessful appeal and petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus, that the boy accidentally fell and hit his head 
while Marsh was in the next room.5  In 2003, when Marsh filed a second 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which experts questioned the 
accuracy of the autopsy report,6 the San Diego district attorney had an 
independent forensic pathologist review the autopsy report.7  The  
pathologist could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
1. Wrongly-Convicted Man To Be Compensated for Prison Time, 10NEWS (Jan.
19, 2006), http://www.10news.com/news/wrongly-convicted-man-to-be-compensated-
for-prison-time. 
2. Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 771 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1228 (S.D. Cal. 2011). 
3. Chisun Lee et al., The Child Cases, PROPUBLICA (June 27, 2011, 11:00 PM), 
http://www.propublica.org/special/the-child-cases.  Before reviewing the boy’s autopsy
report, police believed his death was an accident. Id.
4. Id. 
5. Alexandra Gross, Kenneth Marsh, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3407 (last visited 
July 15, 2013). A writ of habeas corpus is a common law remedy that grants a person
restrained of liberty, such as a prisoner, an opportunity to request a hearing to determine 
the legality of the detention.  39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 6 (2012).  In a habeas corpus 
proceeding, the court decides whether the detention violates the prisoner’s constitutional 
rights and orders the prisoner’s release if the imprisonment is deemed illegal. Id.
6. Lee et al., supra note 3. 
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child’s injuries indicated abuse.8  Accordingly, at the district attorney’s
request, the court granted Marsh’s petition and set aside his conviction.9
   Kenneth Marsh’s story of an innocent man suffering through more 
than twenty years in prison is not an aberration.10  In June 2011, a report 
by ProPublica, National Public Radio, and PBS’s Frontline identified
twenty-three U.S. and Canadian cases where forensic experts helped 
exonerate defendants falsely accused or convicted of killing a child.11  In
each case, as in Marsh’s, a state expert’s determination of the child’s cause
of death played a key role in charging or convicting the defendant.12  Yet
in each case, subsequent review by different experts revealed that the
forensic evidence forming the basis for the defendant’s charges or
conviction was biased or flawed.13  These cases therefore demonstrate a
8. Id. 
9. Id.  Although the court originally released Marsh from prison to await a new
trial, the district attorney dropped all charges against Marsh one month after his release. 
Ken Marsh Exonerated of Murder on September 3, 2004, JUSTICE:DENIED, Fall 2004, at 
10, 10, available at http://justicedenied.org/issue/issue_26/jd_issue_26.pdf. 
10. According to the Innocence Project, since 1989, DNA testing has exonerated
310 individuals of crimes postconviction in the United States.  Facts on Post-Conviction 
DNA Exonerations, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/
Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.php (last visited July 15, 2013).  These 
innocent individuals served, on average, more than thirteen years in prison before
exoneration.  Id.  Exonerations by DNA testing form only part of the picture; in the most
comprehensive compilation of recent U.S. exonerations currently available, researchers
identified 340 total exonerations in the United States between 1989 and 2003.  Samuel R. 
Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 525 (2005).  The exonerated individuals each spent an average of
more than ten years in prison for crimes they did not commit; eighty percent of the 
exonerees spent at least five years in prison. Id. at 524.  The study’s researchers also
concluded that “no doubt thousands . . . of defendants] have been falsely convicted of
serious crimes but have not been exonerated.” Id. at 527.  One recent study provided
empirical support for an estimated wrongful conviction rate of 3%–5% in capital rape-
murders.  D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual
Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 780 (2007).  These cases 
undermine the fundamental principle upon which the American criminal justice system 
is built: “[I]t is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.” 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352.  Although Blackstone’s ten-to-one ratio is 
the original and best known iteration of the tradeoff society should allow between letting
guilty men go free and imprisoning innocent men, American legal academics and 
practitioners have advocated that it is preferable to allow anywhere from one to one 
hundred guilty men go free than to imprison one innocent man. See Alexander Volokh, 
Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 175 (1997). 
















   
   
     
 
     
   





    
 
  
   
 
    
  
  
   
   
 
 
trend in which unsound prosecutorial forensic evidence contributes to 
convicting innocent people of crimes based on children’s deaths.14 
Although the failures of forensic evidence are not limited to child 
death cases15—it is increasingly clear that courts in fact admit flawed 
forensic science in many prosecutions16—these failures are particularly 
14. Edward Schumacher-Matos, Child Death Cases: Proving a Trend, NPR 
OMBUDSMAN BLOG (July 28, 2011, 5:51 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/ombudsman/
2011/07/29/138719187/child-abuse-cases-proving-a-trend?ft=1&f=17370252.  According
to the ProPublica, National Public Radio, and Frontline PBS reporting team, determining 
the frequency with which courts overturn child death convictions was impossible due to
the lack of information available on how many child death cases the Government
prosecutes nationally each year. Id.  After reviewing cases and interviewing judges, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, child advocates, forensic pathologists, and other medical 
experts, the reporting team was nevertheless convinced that a “troubling trend” of
wrongful convictions based on faulty forensic evidence in child death cases is afoot. Id.
15. The use of fraudulent, flawed, or misleading forensic science played a role in 
57% of the first 200 postconviction exonerations of innocent defendants based on DNA 
testing.  Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 75–76 (2008). 
The exonerated convictions involved rape, murder, or both rape and murder. Id. at 73–74. 
Similarly, a 2009 study of 137 DNA exonerees’ trials that included testimony by a forensic
analyst for the prosecution revealed that prosecutorial forensic experts presented invalid
testimony in 60% of the trials.  Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic 
Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009).  The invalid
testimony generally involved either the misuse of empirical population data or an 
overstatement of the probative value of forensic evidence. Id.  This testimony
contributed to wrongful convictions for rape, murder, and attempted murder.  Id. at 13. 
16. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009) (“Serious
deficiencies have been found in the forensic evidence used in criminal trials.”); see also
Craig M. Cooley & Gabriel S. Oberfield, Increasing Forensic Evidence’s Reliability and 
Minimizing Wrongful Convictions: Applying Daubert Isn’t the Only Problem, 43 TULSA 
L. REV. 285, 295–369 (2007) (identifying bite mark identification, hair identification, 
serological analysis and blood typing, fingerprint identification, fiber analysis, arson 
identification, firearms identification, comparative bullet lead analysis, lip print 
identification, and expert misconduct or incompetence as forensic science disciplines 
admitted at trial that contribute to wrongful convictions); Robert Epstein, Fingerprints 
Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint “Science” Is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 
622–49 (2002) (examining the flaws of regularly admitted fingerprint identification 
testimony); Garrett, supra note 15, at 81–85 (classifying “flimsy” forensic evidence 
admitted at trial as including serological analysis of blood or semen, expert comparison
of hair evidence, soil comparison, DNA tests, bite mark evidence, fingerprint evidence,
dog scent identification, spectrographic voice evidence, shoe prints, and fiber comparison);
Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Forensic Science: The Pitfalls of Law Enforcement 
Control of Scientific Research, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 53, 54–55 (2011) (discussing flaws
of routinely admitted forensic methods, including fingerprint examinations, handwriting
comparisons, firearm identifications, hair matching, and exaggerated expert testimony);
Mark Hansen, Believe It or Not, 79 A.B.A. J. 64, 64–66 (1993) (providing an overview
of the admission of shoeprint identification in criminal cases and its lack of a scientific 
basis); D.H. Kaye, The Current State of Bullet-Lead Evidence, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 99,
102–06 (2006) (describing regular admission of expert “testimony associating a bullet in 
a suspect’s possession with a bullet used in a crime” and the lack of data supporting such
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significant in such cases.  Because cases involving a child’s death generally 
proceed on only two pieces of evidence: (1) whose care the child was in
at the time of death and (2) a forensic expert’s determination of the 
cause of the child’s death, the prosecution’s forensic evidence has
particular weight in these cases.17  As a result, the risk of wrongful child
death convictions based on flawed forensic science is particularly high.18 
Wrongful convictions like those occurring in child death cases undermine 
the success of the U.S. criminal justice system.  A central goal of the
criminal justice system is protecting the innocent accused from erroneous 
conviction and punishment.19  Several cornerstones of the American 
adversary criminal trial system reflect this goal, including (1) the
prosecution’s burden of proving a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
Corpus Provide Relief for Prisoners Possibly Convicted on Misunderstood Fire Science?, 10 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 213, 227–28 (2009) (explaining how forensic methods relied on 
in criminal proceedings to identify arson have been deemed incorrect); Adam Deitch,
Comment, An Inconvenient Tooth: Forensic Odontology Is an Inadmissible Junk Science 
when It Is Used To “Match” Teeth to Bitemarks in Skin, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1205, 1214– 
19 (2009) (highlighting courts’ regular admission of bite mark identification testimony in 
criminal cases and its scientific flaws).
17. See 2 STEPHEN T. GOUDGE, INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY IN 
ONTARIO 4 (2008), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/
goudge/report/v2_en_pdf/Vol_2_Eng.pdf; see also BILL WALSH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
INVESTIGATING CHILD FATALITIES 6 (2005), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
ojjdp/209764.pdf (noting that because child death cases often lack witnesses or direct 
evidence, successful prosecution of these cases depends on proving that the suspect was
the only person with the child at the time of injury and that the injury was intentional).
18. See Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful 
Convictions After a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825, 857–58
(2010) (explaining that wrongful convictions are more likely when the crime is against a 
child due to inflamed public pressure that causes rushed investigations leading to the
wrong suspect); see also A.C. Thompson et al., The Hardest Cases: When Children Die,
Justice Can Be Elusive, PROPUBLICA (June 27, 2011, 11:00 PM), http://www.propublica. 
org/article/the-hardest-cases-when-children-die-justice-can-be-elusive (“[M]edical examiners 
and coroners have repeatedly mishandled cases of infant and child deaths, helping to put 
innocent people behind bars.”).
19. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (“[C]oncern about the injustice
that results from the conviction of an innocent person has long been at the core of our
criminal justice system.”); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.8(e) (5th
ed. 2009).  This goal imposes a duty on the prosecution to refrain from using improper 
methods to produce a conviction.  Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).  This 
duty stems from the fact that the prosecutor’s role is not to win every case but rather to
ensure that justice is done.  Id.  Justice is only done when “guilt shall not escape or 





























   
  
doubt;20 (2) jury instructions presuming a criminal defendant innocent 
until proven guilty;21 (3) the prosecution’s duty to disclose exculpatory 
evidence to the defendant;22 and (4) the requirement of a unanimous jury
verdict.23  The Supreme Court has incorporated into its constitutional 
criminal law jurisprudence society’s determination that it is far worse to 
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free, recognizing the 
20. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (“The reasonable-doubt standard
plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure.  It is a prime instrument
for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error.”).  American courts have
imposed a “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of persuasion on the prosecution 
since as early as the nation’s founding.  Id. at 361.  Lower courts widely required this 
burden of proof, and the Supreme Court routinely assumed the Constitution required it, 
even before the Court explicitly held in 1970 that the Due Process Clause requires it.  Id.
at 362, 364.  In Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court described this standard of proof
as “designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment” 
and as reflecting a judgment that individuals’ interest in the denial of their liberty or life 
and society’s interest in avoiding erroneous convictions together require that “society
impos[e] almost the entire risk of error upon itself.”  455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982) (quoting 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979)). 
21. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that
there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic 
and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law.”).  English common law borrowed the presumption of the innocence of the
criminal accused from Roman law, which influenced the American courts to build the
presumption into their criminal system.  Id. at 454–56.  In Taylor v. Kentucky, the Supreme
Court affirmed the importance of the presumption as a safeguard against convicting the 
innocent that is distinct from the prosecution’s burden of proof.  436 U.S. 478, 483–86
(1978).  The Court recognized that a jury instruction on the presumption of innocence is 
a valuable way of impressing on the jury the importance of defendants’ right to have 
their guilt or innocence determined solely based on evidence introduced at trial. Id.
22. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme
Court held that the State violated a capital murder defendant’s due process rights when it 
suppressed a third party’s confession to the murder from the defendant’s trial.  Id. at 84– 
86. Allowing the prosecution to suppress exculpatory evidence would violate a defendant’s 
right to due process by preventing the accused from having a fair trial, and “[s]ociety
wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system 
of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.” Id. at 87. 
23. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 407–08 (1972) (describing how the 
unanimous verdict requirement arose during the Middle Ages and became an accepted 
feature of jury trials by American courts by the eighteenth century).  Despite the history 
of the unanimous jury verdict requirement for criminal convictions, the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, does not require a unanimous verdict for all criminal convictions.  Id. at
406.  Further, the Supreme Court held in Johnson v. Louisiana that the Due Process 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution also does not require a unanimous verdict in criminal 
cases.  406 U.S. 356, 363 (1972).  However, a unanimous jury verdict is required for a 
conviction in federal felony trials under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.  FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 31(a).  Most states also require a unanimous jury verdict in felony convictions. 
See Emil J. Bove III, Note, Preserving the Value of Unanimous Criminal Jury Verdicts 
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constitutional right of the criminal accused to a just and fair verdict.24 
This jurisprudence reflects the Court and public’s conception of the
American criminal justice system as a scheme of truth-seeking that
ostensibly skews the risk of error toward the prosecution.25
   Despite the U.S. justice system’s purported protections of the innocent
accused, cases involving a child’s death put innocent defendants at risk 
of wrongful conviction due to courts’ ready admission of prosecutorial 
forensic evidence that may be invalid, unreliable, or misleading and the 
defendant’s lack of a fair opportunity to rebut such evidence.  The current 
standards governing the admissibility of scientific evidence—Federal
Rules of Evidence 702 and 703 and the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of those rules in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.26— 
enhance the need for defense access to forensic experts to challenge the
prosecution’s forensic evidence in child death cases.  Yet the limited reach 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ake v. Oklahoma,27 prescribing when
the state must provide indigent defendants with expert witnesses, is
insufficient to provide indigent defendants reliable access to these experts. 
This Comment proposes that because of ongoing concerns regarding 
the reliability and validity of forensic science in the United States, the 
Due Process Clause constitutionally mandates the appointment of forensic
experts for indigent defendants in criminal cases arising out of a child’s
death if the prosecution relies on forensic evidence.28  Part II of this
24. See Janet C. Hoeffel, The Gender Gap: Revealing Inequities in Admission of 
Social Science Evidence in Criminal Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 41, 73
(2001).  A verdict is “just and fair” if the Government did not have an advantage over the 
defendant during trial, despite the State’s power and vast resources, which constitutional 
criminal procedure jurisprudence seeks to balance by providing the defendant with the 
necessary tools of an adequate defense. Id. at 73 n.187. 
25. Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, 
and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 895 (2008). 
26. 509 U.S. 579, 589–92 (1993). 
27. 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985). 
28. The accuracy and reliability of the American forensic sciences as a whole 
have come under attack in recent years, culminating in a 2009 study by the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS), which identified concerns about the scientific validity of 
forensic methods, forensic laboratory errors, and the intentional manipulation of forensic 
evidence.  See Beth A. Riffe, Comment, The Aftermath of Melendez: Highlighting the
Need for Accreditation-Based Rules of Admissibility for Forensic Evidence, 27 T.M. 
COOLEY L. REV. 165, 167–68 (2010).  The NAS identified a number of major flaws in 
the U.S. forensic science system and made a series of recommendations to improve the 





















   
   
   












Comment provides an overview of the current law governing the
admissibility of forensic expert testimony in criminal cases and explains 
why these admissibility standards create a need for the appointment of 
defense forensic experts to protect the rights of criminal defendants.  Part
III then discusses Due Process Clause jurisprudence on the necessity of
appointing defense experts in criminal cases and the absence of an
established right to state-funded defense experts for indigent defendants. 
In light of criminal defendants’ lack of access to state-appointed experts,
Part IV examines child death cases wherein the prosecution relied on
forensic experts to establish the child’s cause of death and explores the
unique ways in which access to defense experts is critical to building an 
adequate defense in these cases.  In Part V, I conclude that in the unique 
context of child death cases built on prosecutorial forensic evidence, due 
process mandates the appointment of defense experts for defendants who
cannot afford to hire them. 
II. THE DAUBERT STANDARD FOR THE ADMISSION OF FORENSIC 
EVIDENCE CREATES A CRITICAL ROLE FOR   
DEFENSE EXPERTS
The admission of expert trial testimony is limited to testimony that
will help jurors accurately determine what happened in a case.29  Under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, a witness may be qualified to testify as an
expert based on knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.30 
29. Evidence law embraces the view that trials function as a way to resolve the 
search for truth; it also generally exists to limit the admission of evidence to that which 
helps the jury correctly decide the facts of a case.  CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. 
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 1 (7th ed. 
2011). 
30. FED. R. EVID. 702. This lenient standard does not require any specific 
specialization or certification.  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 29, at 619.  Further, 
an expert may be qualified to testify as an expert witness by fulfilling any one of these 
five factors.  See, e.g., United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999)
(holding financial analyst for the Federal Bureau of Investigation qualified to testify as 
expert on amount of business fraud despite lack of certification or advanced degree); 
Thomas v. Newton Int’l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266, 1269–70 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that 
lifetime longshore worker with no formal education was qualified to testify as expert 
about safety of uncovered manhole in vessel); United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487,
1496 (8th Cir. 1994) (approving of gang member and drug dealer as qualified to testify
as expert on drug trafficking based on experience); Lavespere v. Niagra Mach. & Tool
Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 176 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding engineering professor qualified
to testify as expert on safety of press brake design despite lack of practical experience 
designing such a system); DaSilva v. Am. Brands, Inc., 845 F.2d 356, 361 (1st Cir.
1988) (concluding that mechanical engineer was qualified to testify as expert about 
safety design of industrial machine despite lack of practical experience with the specific 
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Expert witnesses so qualified may testify as long as their specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence presented 
or to determine a fact in issue.31  The expert’s testimony must rely on
sufficient facts or data, must be the product of reliable principles and
methods, and must reliably apply those principles and methods to the facts 
of the case.32  Furthermore, expert witnesses may testify regarding 
opinions based on inadmissible facts or data if experts in their field
reasonably rely on those types of facts to form opinions.33  The Federal
Rules of Evidence therefore permit expert witnesses wider latitude to offer 
opinions than lay witnesses, who may offer opinions based only on 
firsthand knowledge or observation.34 
In 1993, the Supreme Court in Daubert announced the proper standard
for trial courts to apply to determine the admissibility of scientific expert
testimony under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703.35  The Court
held that scientific testimony is admissible only if it is reliable and relevant 
to the case, creating a “gatekeeping” role for trial judges over scientific 
testimony.36  The Court identified a nonexhaustive list of factors trial judges
Enforcement Agency agent qualified to testify as expert on meaning of drug slang based
on practical experience in drug investigations); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 
88 (3d Cir. 1979) (agreeing that engineering professor was qualified to testify as expert 
on safety of elevator control buttons without having background in the design and 
manufacturing of elevators).  The trial judge decides whether a witness is qualified to 
testify as an expert.  United States v. Chang, 207 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000). 
31. FED. R. EVID. 702. The “trier of fact” is either the jury in a jury trial or the 
judge in a bench trial.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 671 (9th ed. 2009).
32. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
33. FED R. EVID. 703. Under this Rule, courts admit expert testimony based on a
wide range of otherwise inadmissible documents or other pieces of evidence.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Pablo, 696 F.3d 1280, 1289–93 (10th Cir. 2012) (DNA analysis by other 
expert); United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292, 298 (3d Cir. 1978) (government tax
audit); United States v. Shields, 573 F.2d 18, 21–22 (10th Cir. 1978) (handwriting
sample); United States v. Golden, 532 F.2d 1244, 1247 (9th Cir. 1976) (opinions of other
experts); United States v. Hollman, 541 F.2d 196, 200 (8th Cir. 1976) (laboratory
reports). 
34. FED. R. EVID. 701. 
35. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). 
36. Id.  The Supreme Court read the Federal Rules of Evidence as superseding the
dominant standard courts used to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence, the 
“general acceptance” test.  Id. at 587–88.  In 1923, in Frye v. United States, the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia looked to whether a systolic blood pressure
deception test had gained general acceptance in its scientific field to determine if it
should admit testimony on the test’s results at trial.  Id. at 585–86 (citing Frye v. United




     
     
  
 
    
 
   
     
   
    
       
  
   






     
 
 
      
  
 
   
 
should consider to determine whether the theory or technique underlying 
scientific testimony is relevant and reliable, including (1) whether the theory
or technique can be and has been tested; (2) whether it has been subject to
peer review or publication; (3) its known or potential rate of error and the
existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation; and
(4) whether it is generally accepted in the scientific community to which 
the expert belongs.37 
The Supreme Court refined this admissibility standard in two subsequent
decisions.  In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the Court established that 
trial judges have broad discretion to decide the admissibility of scientific 
evidence based on the Daubert factors.38  The Court instructed appellate
courts to review Daubert-based admissibility decisions deferentially and 
to overturn the trial court’s evidentiary decision only if the trial court 
majority of courts followed the Frye test and admitted scientific evidence generally
accepted in its field. Id. at 585.  The Court’s decision in Daubert came against a 
backdrop of heightened scrutiny of U.S. forensic sciences by both the community and the
public at large. See Joseph L. Peterson & Anna S. Leggett, The Evolution of Forensic 
Science: Progress amid the Pitfalls, 36 STETSON L. REV. 621, 635–40 (2007). The
exoneration of numerous prisoners through DNA testing brought the unreliability of 
forensic evidence routinely used in criminal trials to the media and the public’s attention.
Id. at 637.  In 1991, Peter W. Huber’s high-profile book, Galileo’s Revenge: Junk Science in
the Courtroom, called for the legal system to reassess the standards of admissibility for 
scientific evidence in light of mounting proof that courts regularly admitted unreliable 
science at trial. Id. at 638–39 (citing PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK 
SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991)).  Huber’s book specifically discussed the controversy
over whether Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals’ drug Bendectin caused birth defects that
ultimately led to the lawsuit in Daubert and called for a stricter standard for admitting 
scientific evidence into court. Id. at 639. 
37. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.  In its decision, the Supreme Court “struck a
compromise” between assigning judges or the scientific community the sole role of 
determining which scientific methods are valid.  Jay P. Kesan, Note, An Autopsy of 
Scientific Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 84 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2000 (1996).  Although
the Court assigned the ultimate determination of whether scientific evidence is reliable to
trial court judges, the Daubert standard incorporates the scientific community’s opinion 
into the judge’s admissibility determination by way of the “general acceptance” and 
“peer review/publication” factors. See id.  Commentators argue that the decision, intended to
settle the “junk science” debate, failed to provide courts with a standard approach for 
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.  Id. at 1997, 2000; see also Craig 
Lee Montz, Trial Judges as Scientific Gatekeepers After Daubert, Joiner, Kumho Tire, 
and Amended Rule 702: Is Anyone Still Seriously Buying This?, 33 UWLA L. REV. 87, 
89 (2001) (“In sum, the dilemma is that Daubert is both more and less restrictive of 
expert testimony.”); Adam J. Siegel, Note, Setting Limits on Judicial Scientific, Technical,
and Other Specialized Fact-Finding in the New Millennium, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 167, 
179–80 (2000) (“As evidenced by many post-Daubert decisions, the courts had a 
difficult time interpreting and applying the gatekeeping mandate in an appropriate and
consistent fashion.”). 
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abused its discretion in reaching the decision.39  Second, in Kumho Tire 
Co. v. Carmichael, the Court confirmed that the Daubert standard applies to
all expert testimony.40  Accordingly, the Daubert standard governs both
civil and criminal cases.41 In response to these cases, in 2000, Congress
amended Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to incorporate the Supreme 
Court’s holdings.42  The amended rule requires the trial court to decide 
whether proffered expert testimony is “reliable and helpful” when
determining its admissibility.43  The following subparts examine how
39. Id. 
40. 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999). 
41. See id.; see also Lee Richard Goebes, The Equality Principle Revisited: The 
Relationship of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals to Ake v. Oklahoma, 15 CAP. 
DEF. J. 1, 35 (2002) (explaining that despite an explicit Supreme Court holding applying
the Daubert standard to civil cases, courts implicitly recognize that the standard does 
apply to criminal cases). Daubert was a civil case wherein two minors and their parents 
sued the marketers of a prescription drug for birth defects allegedly caused by the 
plaintiffs’ mothers’ ingestion of the drug. 509 U.S. at 582.  However, the Court based its 
holding in Daubert on its interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, id. at 587, 
which apply in both civil and criminal cases and proceedings, FED. R. EVID. 1101. 
42. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
43. Id. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert standard are binding 
only on federal courts, a majority of states have adopted the standard or follow a test 
based on its factors.  Turner v. State, 746 So. 2d 355, 358–59 (Ala. 1998); State v. Coon, 
974 P.2d 386, 395 (Alaska 1999); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark. v. Foote, 14 
S.W.3d 512, 519 (Ark. 2000); People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 77 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); 
State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 743 (Conn. 1997); Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 73 (Del. 
1993); State v. Merwin, 962 P.2d 1026, 1030 (Idaho 1998); Harrison v. State, 644
N.E.2d 1243, 1252 (Ind. 1995); Hutchison v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 
882, 887–88 (Iowa 1994); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Ky. 1995), 
overruled on other grounds by Fugate v. Commonwealth, 993 S.W.2d  931 (Ky. 1999); 
State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1122–23 (La. 1993); Green v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 673
A.2d 216, 218 (Me. 1996); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (Mass.
1994); Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 685 N.W.2d 391, 408–09 (Mich. 2004); Miss. 
Transp. Comm’n v. McLemore, 2001-CA-01039-SCT (¶ 5) (Miss. 2003); State v.
Moore, 885 P.2d 457, 471 (Mont. 1994), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Gollehon, 906 P.2d 697 (Mont. 1995); Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 631 N.W.2d 862,
876 (Neb. 2001); State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 203 (N.M. 1993); Setzer v. Boise
Cascade Corp., 473 S.E.2d 431, 435 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Martens, 629 N.E.2d
462, 466 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 328 (Okla. Crim. App.
1995); State v. Futch, 860 P.2d 264, 270 n.7 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (en banc), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Howard, 134 P.3d 1042, 1046 (Or. Ct. App. 2006); DiPetrillo
v. Dow Chem. Co., 729 A.2d 677, 686–87 (R.I. 1999); State v. Council, 515 S.E.2d 508,
518 (S.C. 1999); State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482, 484 (S.D. 1994); McDaniel v. CSX 
Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 265 (Tenn. 1997); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. 
Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex. 1995); State v. Brooks, 643 A.2d 226, 229 (Vt. 






   
 







   
 
 
    
    
   
   
   
 
 




courts apply the Daubert standard in criminal cases and how Daubert 
has affected the reliability of scientific evidence admitted in criminal trials. 
A.  Failures To Screen Unreliable or Invalid Forensic Evidence
   The Daubert standard has failed to guide courts to exclude unreliable
forensic science from criminal trials.  Daubert’s creation of a gatekeeping 
role for trial judges requires them to apply its factors rigorously to screen
all scientific evidence for reliability.44  The Supreme Court intended the 
Daubert standard to be an “exacting” standard of reliability for the 
admission of expert evidence.45  Unfortunately, “[t]hat rigorous screening . . . 
has not materialized with respect to forensic science evidence offered by
the prosecution in criminal cases.”46 
For example, recent reviews of DNA exonerations indicate that trial
courts are continuing to admit invalid forensic evidence.47  A review of 
eighty-six DNA exonerations revealed that forensic science testing 
errors contributed to 63% of the wrongful convictions studied and that 
false or misleading testimony by prosecutorial forensic experts contributed 
to 27% of those convictions.48  Similarly, a recent study of 200 DNA
exonerations found that faulty forensic evidence formed the basis of
57% of exonerees’ convictions.49  Despite evidence that forensic science is
contributing to erroneous convictions, Daubert has led to “remarkably
little research on the accuracy of traditional forensic sciences.”50 
This trend is not limited to DNA exonerations.  In a comprehensive 
study of 340 exonerations in the United States between 1989 and 2003, 
P.2d 467, 468 (Wyo. 1999).  This Comment discusses both federal and state cases that 
apply the Daubert standard.  Sixteen states and the District of Columbia continue to 
apply Frye, while four states—Georgia, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin—developed their 
own tests to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence.  Alice B. Lustre, Annotation,
Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in 
State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5TH 453 (2001).
44. Findley, supra note 25, at 933.  Although courts apply the same standard to
screen prosecution and defense expert evidence, as discussed below, the prosecution is 
far more likely to introduce forensic evidence, and thus the failure to screen such evidence
rigorously results primarily in the admission of flawed scientific evidence offered by the 
State. See infra Part II.B.
45. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 442 (2000). 
46. Findley, supra note 25, at 934. 
47. See Garrett, supra note 15, at 60; Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The 
Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCI. 892, 893 (2005). 
48. Saks & Koehler, supra note 47, at 892 fig.1.  Researchers opined that this 
statistic likely understates the rate at which forensic science expert testimony contributes 
to erroneous convictions. Id. at 893. 
49. Garrett, supra note 15, at 60. 
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researchers found that forensic scientists committed perjury while testifying 
for the Government in twenty-four cases.51  In addition to perjured 
testimony, courts admitted testimony based on forged fingerprints, faked 
autopsies, and false laboratory reports.52  If the Daubert standard operated 
as the exacting test the Supreme Court envisioned, courts properly 
applying its factors to scrutinize forensic evidence closely would catch
such flagrant errors. 
Three examples of ongoing biased and incompetent testimony by
leading U.S. forensic expert witnesses highlight how courts have failed
to screen out misconduct and ineptitude by government expert witnesses.
First, in 1993, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia determined 
that the former head serologist of the West Virginia State Police crime
laboratory, Fred Zain, falsified test results in criminal prosecutions in as
many as 134 cases between 1979 and 1989.53  Second, in 1992, Texas 
pathologist Ralph Erdmann was convicted of faking autopsies after his 
testimony helped prosecutors obtain at least twenty death penalty 
convictions.54  Finally, anthropology professor Dr. Louise Robbins 
testified in multiple murder cases about a method of foot comparisons 
she used to match footprints found at a crime scene with a defendant’s
shoes.55  She stood alone as the only forensic expert on record to identify
the foot comparison method as a valid scientific technique.56  Despite the 
fact that no empirical testing or published findings supported Robbins’s 
method and that other experts criticized the method’s lack of a scientific 
foundation, the court permitted Robbins to testify about the method in
multiple cases involving a possible death sentence.57 
51. Gross et al., supra note 10, at 543. 
52. Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need To 
Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 169 (2007). 
53. In re W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d 501, 509, 510 n.10, 520 
(W. Va. 1993). 
54. Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The 
Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 439, 449–52 (1997). 
55. Id. at 457–58. 
56. Id. at 458. 
57. Id. at 459–60.  A court rejected Robbins’s testimony in just one case based on
her own admission that no other experts in the anthropological community employed her
method of shoeprint identification or similar techniques.  People v. Ferguson, 526 
N.E.2d 525, 531 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).  Courts rejected Robbins’s shoeprint method of
comparison only when a national panel of 135 anthropologists and lawyers confirmed 
the method as unreliable.  Giannelli, supra note 54, at 461 & n.128. 
481
 






























In addition to admitting false testimony under Daubert, courts admit 
evidence based on suspect forensic methods despite Daubert’s focus on 
reliable scientific bases.  A particularly glaring example of the admission 
of flawed forensic science in criminal trials under Daubert is the pervasive
use of comparative bullet lead analysis prior to 2005.58  Courts allowed 
experts to testify in approximately 2500 criminal cases spanning more
than thirty years that using this technique, they could match a bullet
found at a crime scene to a specific batch of lead, manufacturer, or even 
box of ammunition, despite the method’s lack of credibility.59  Courts
routinely admitted such testimony even though few published studies on 
the technique existed,60 which should have raised concerns given Daubert’s
emphasis on the value of peer review and falsifiability in evaluating
scientific reliability.61  Courts did not question the validity of the technique,
despite its lack of empirical support, until 2004 when the National 
Research Council concluded that available data did not support expert 
testimony linking crime bullets to a particular source.62
   Similarly, courts routinely admit unreliable prosecutorial evidence from 
forensic dentists attributing bite marks on a victim’s body to a particular
person.  After a California Court of Appeal accepted testimony by a
forensic dentist linking an “exceptionally well defined human bite mark” 
on a victim’s skin to the defendant’s highly irregular teeth in People v.
Marx,63 courts in a large number of states began accepting bite mark 
testimony “whenever a person displaying apparent credentials” would
testify.64  Courts continue to admit such evidence under the Daubert
standard, relying on pre-Daubert precedent as support that bite mark
identifications are reliable and valid, rather than closely examining the 
evidence as Daubert purports to require.65  Courts admitting bite mark 
58. See Giannelli, supra note 52, at 199–203.  Comparative bullet lead analysis
allows analysts to compare bullet lead fragments from a crime scene with bullets found 
in a suspect’s possession.  Id. at 200. 
59. Findley, supra note 25, at 968. 
60. Giannelli, supra note 52, at 200. 
61. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (“But
submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of ‘good science,’ 
in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be 
detected.”).
62. Giannelli, supra note 52, at 201. 
63. 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 354 n.8 (Ct. App. 1975). 
64. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards 
of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 138 (2000). 
65. Id. at 138–39.  Courts regularly point to other courts’ acceptance of bite mark 
identification testimony to establish its reliability.  Id.  Under this circular logic, one 
court accepts the method as reliable based on other court decisions; its decision then
becomes the basis of subsequent decisions holding the method reliable, without an
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identifications ignore a notable lack of published research establishing 
when forensic dentists can reliably make such identifications.66  In fact,
data from proficiency tests and other studies indicate that false-positive 
error rates for bite mark identifications run as high as 64%.67  These factors
should lead courts applying Daubert to exclude bite mark identifications 
as unreliable, but without pressure from defendants, courts do not use 
the Daubert factors to scrutinize evidence based on forensic methods they
routinely admitted under pre-Daubert standards. 
These examples demonstrate how systemic flaws in the U.S. forensic
science system compound the failure of the Daubert standard to screen
out unreliable prosecutorial forensic evidence.  American forensic science
currently lacks quality assurance protocols, accreditation standards, and
technical procedure standardization.68  In response to increasing concerns
over the validity of U.S. forensic science, in 2009, Congress commissioned 
the National Research Council’s National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
to undertake a study to identify the improvements needed in forensic
science.69  The NAS concluded that the forensic science system has
“serious problems” that can only be solved by a national commitment to
overhaul its current structure.70 The problems are largely attributable to 
the United States’ current lack of national standards regulating forensic 
pathology.71 Notably, there is no uniform certification of forensic
practitioners between states, most jurisdictions do not require forensic
practitioner certification, and most forensic science disciplines do not have
(¶ 54) (Miss. 1999) (Smith, J., concurring) (listing cases from thirty-one states approving 
of bite mark evidence as admissible scientific evidence to prove its reliability).  Despite
the bite mark identification method’s lack of empirical support, some courts go so far as 
to take judicial notice of its reliability, meaning that the prosecution is not required to 
offer any evidence establishing the method as reliable for the court to accept its 
admissibility. See, e.g., State v. Richards, 804 P.2d 109, 111 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990);
People v. Marsh, 441 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Armstrong, 369
S.E.2d 870, 877 (W. Va. 1988). 
66. Risinger, supra note 64, at 142. 
67. Saks & Koehler, supra note 47, at 895 (citing 3 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., 
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 524–87 
(2002)). 
68. Giannelli, supra note 52, at 211–14. 
69. Harry T. Edwards & Constantine Gatsonis, Preface to NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: 
A PATH FORWARD, at xix (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT]. 
70. Id. at xx. 





























   
 
   
 
 
mandatory certification programs.72 Additionally, there are few peer-
reviewed published studies establishing the scientific validity of many
common interpretations of forensic evidence offered in criminal
prosecutions, especially testimony that purports to match evidence to a
specific individual.73  Accordingly, judges who do not closely screen
forensic evidence rely on a flawed system to establish the reliability of 
scientific methods used by expert witnesses.
Thus, the shortcomings of U.S. forensic sciences exacerbate the Daubert
standard’s key problem: its reliance on judges to make scientific reliability
assessments they have no expertise to make.  By taking the question of 
the reliability of scientific evidence from the scientific community and 
giving it to the trial court judge as gatekeeper, the Daubert standard
requires judges, who have no background or training in evaluating complex
scientific evidence or its bases, to appraise scientific or technical
knowledge.74  As a result, research indicates that judges have trouble
interpreting and applying the technical Daubert factors.75  A survey of 
400 state trial court judges who make admissibility decisions utilizing 
the Daubert standard revealed that only 6% of judges had a true
72. Id. at 6–7.  The lack of formal standards governing forensic science should 
trouble courts under Daubert’s instruction that courts consider “the existence and 
maintenance of standards controlling the [scientific] technique’s operation” in determining its
reliability.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). 
73. NAS REPORT, supra note 69, at 8.  Many techniques used by forensic experts 
to testify about “matching” a specimen to a particular individual are too imprecise to 
accurately identify a specific individual. Id. at 7–8.  To address these deficiencies and 
improve the reliability of forensic sciences in the United States, the NAS made a series
of recommendations, including the adoption of uniform and enforceable best practices,
mandatory certification and accreditation programs, increases in staffing within existing 
crime laboratories and medical examiners’ offices, and upgrades to organization structures.
Id. at 15.  The NAS also recommended that forensic disciplines utilizing matching 
characteristics develop “rigorous protocols to guide these subjective interpretations and 
pursue equally rigorous research and evaluation programs.”  Id. at 8.  In 2009, in
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court cited the NAS report for the 
proposition that forensic testing is not immune from manipulation by the prosecution
given the oversight of a majority of forensic labs by law enforcement.  557 U.S. 305, 318 
(2009).  The Court concluded that, given the demonstrated fallibility of forensic science, 
introducing a lab report against a criminal defendant without giving the defendant a 
chance to cross-examine the person who prepared the report violated the defendant’s
confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at 318–21.  This case demonstrates 
how the NAS’s findings could potentially have a large influence on the use of forensic
evidence in criminal prosecutions.
74. Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of 
Expert Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 230 (2000). 
75. Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of 
Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
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understanding of falsifiability and only 4% clearly understood error
rate—two key factors of the Daubert analysis.76  Further, the majority of
judges did not recognize or acknowledge their lack of understanding
about what Daubert’s guidelines mean or how to apply them, indicating 
that judges believe they understand the requirements of Daubert better
than they actually do.77
   Judges’ demonstrated limited understanding of scientific concepts
leads to troubling questions about whether judges are able to use the 
Daubert criteria to make accurate assessments of the reliability of proffered 
scientific evidence.78  These implications are particularly troubling
considering that Daubert’s underlying rationale, that scientific or
technical testimony not filtered for reliability should not influence lay fact
finders, depends on the assumption that trial judges are better suited 
to assess scientific testimony than are average lay jurors.79  In fact, as the
following subpart demonstrates, judges’ limited ability to make highly 
technical reliability assessments leads judges to allow a significant amount
of prosecutorial forensic evidence to pass to the jury unfiltered. 
B.  Pro-Prosecution Bias
The high percentage of scientific evidence found admissible when
proffered by prosecutors compared with scientific evidence proffered by 
defendants illustrates courts’ failure to apply Daubert to screen
prosecutorial forensic evidence carefully.  In the five and one-half years
following Daubert, trial courts admitted testimony by 95.8% of prosecution 
experts compared with just 7.8% of defense experts.80  Furthermore, in 
published opinions dealing with Daubert challenges to the reliability of
expert evidence, federal district courts denied eleven out of twelve
76. Gatowski et al., supra note 75, at 444–47.  This study appears to confirm the
fears of Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion in Daubert, in which he expressed
apprehension that judges would struggle to define the concept of “falsifiability” and hesitated
to impose on trial judges the obligation to become amateur scientists in order to perform
their gatekeeping role.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600–01 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
77. Gatowski et al., supra note 75, at 452. 
78. Id. at 453. 
79. Joseph T. Walsh, Keeping the Gate: The Evolving Role of the Judiciary in 
Admitting Scientific Evidence, 83 JUDICATURE 140, 143 (1999). 
80. Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert 
















   
 
 
   
 




















defense challenges to the admission of government expert evidence and 
once admitted the challenged evidence on a restricted basis.81 The 
prosecution, however, prevailed in two-thirds of its challenges to defense
proffers of expert evidence.82  Similarly, in published state court decisions,
the prosecution prevailed in 76% of defense challenges to government-
proffered expert evidence and three-fourths of prosecutorial challenges to
defense expertise.83  The NAS similarly concluded from reviewing reported
opinions that trial judges rarely exclude expert testimony offered by
prosecutors.84 
The unequal treatment of the admission of scientific evidence continues 
on the appellate level.  In 120 federal appellate court opinions reviewing
the trial court’s admission of prosecution expert evidence under Daubert, 
the prosecution prevailed in sixty-one out of sixty-seven challenges to its
experts.85  The appellate court reversed a defendant’s conviction because 
of unreliable prosecution expert evidence in only one of the six successful 
defense appeals.86  Defense challenges based on the improper exclusion 
of defense witnesses were similarly unsuccessful: of fifty-four challenges,
the criminal defendant lost forty-four.87  Overall, the appellate courts
found defense-proffered expert testimony to be properly excluded in 83%
of cases but found government-proffered expert testimony to be properly
81. Risinger, supra note 64, at 109.  Although one might argue that defense 
challenges to the admission of prosecutorial expert evidence at trial are unsuccessful 
because they have no merit and challenge infallible prosecution evidence, the study’s
author actually found that more commonly, defendants failed to raise attacks on even the 
weakest kinds of common forensic testimony offered by the prosecution. Id. at 135. 
82. Id. at 110.  The prosecution initiated a significantly higher number of challenges 
than the defense: researchers located forty-two opinions involving prosecution challenges to
proffered defense expert evidence in federal court and only twelve opinions involving 
defense challenges to proffered prosecution expert evidence. Id. at 109.  The prosecution
prevailed in twenty-eight of its challenges. Id. at 110. 
83. Id. at 111. 
84. NAS REPORT, supra note 69, at 11.  Obtaining a clear picture of exactly how 
trial courts handle Daubert admissibility questions in criminal cases is difficult due to a
lack of published evidentiary opinions.  Id. However, the NAS concluded that the 
discrepancy in admission rates of prosecutorial and defense expert evidence under 
Daubert reflected prosecutors’ advantage over defendants in accessing expert witnesses.
Id.  In contrast, in civil cases, where plaintiffs and defendants are more likely to have 
equal access to expert witnesses, the NAS found the admission rate of plaintiff and
defendant expert evidence more balanced.  Id.
85. Risinger, supra note 64, at 105. 
86. Id.  Of the five remaining successful defense appeals, one involved the district 
court’s failure to conduct a Daubert hearing at all, three involved errors in the witness 
testifying beyond the scope of the witness’s expertise—each of which was held to be
harmless error—and one involved the failure of an expert to apply valid methods to the 
factual conditions of the case dependably. Id. at 105–06. 
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excluded as unreliable only once.88  In sum, the Daubert standard has had
almost no effect on the admission rate of forensic evidence proffered by
the prosecution in criminal cases.89 
The prosecution’s superior access to forensic science and expert witnesses
partially explains the prosecution’s relative success in getting expert
evidence admitted at trial.90 The police oversee 79% of crime laboratories,
and most labs examine only evidence submitted by the prosecution.91 
In contrast, defense counsel attempting to retain an expert to perform
forensic testing must (1) gain the prosecutor’s approval or court’s
authorization to access the evidence in order to test it and (2) either find a
laboratory to conduct the testing or get a court order to perform testing in
the government’s laboratories.92  In addition to making forensic testing 
inaccessible to criminal defendants, this system encourages a pro-
prosecutorial bias created by forensic scientists’ close working relationship 
with law enforcement.93  This bias leads forensic scientists at police-led 
laboratories to view themselves “not as neutral fact-finders, but as
‘police in lab coats’” and to seek test results that match the prosecution’s
goals.94  Under this system, the potential for prosecution experts to
88. Id. at 108.  The NAS again echoed these findings when it concluded that
reported opinions suggest appellate courts routinely deny defense appeals contesting the 
trial court’s admission of the prosecution’s expert evidence.  NAS REPORT, supra note 
69, at 11.  Interestingly, appellate courts also appeared more willing to overturn trial
court decisions on the admissibility of expert evidence in civil cases than in criminal
cases. Id.
89. Risinger, supra note 64, at 149 (“[E]xpertise proffered by the prosecution in 
criminal cases has been largely insulated from any change in pre-Daubert standards or
approach.”).
90. Findley, supra note 25, at 906. 
91. Giannelli, supra note 54, at 470 (citing Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Capabilities, 
Uses, and Effects of the Nation’s Criminalistics Laboratories, 30 J. FORENSIC SCI. 10,
11–13 (1985)). 
92. Findley, supra note 25, at 907. 
93. Id. at 906; see also Giannelli, supra note 54, at 470 (“Considering the 
professional relationship between crime labs and police departments, pro-prosecution
bias in forensic science is not surprising.”). 
94. J. Herbie DiFonzo, The Crimes of Crime Labs, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 
(2005).  One factor contributing to expert witness pro-prosecution bias is the secretive 
nature of the prosecution’s pretrial preparation of the witness.  Bennett L. Gershman,
Misuse of Scientific Evidence by Prosecutors, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 17, 30–31
(2003).  Second, prosecutors create a demand for biased witnesses by seeking out experts 
who will support their theories.  Id. at 31.  Commentators suggest that prosecutors 
deliberately exploit witnesses’ biases by eliciting opinions they know are “erroneous, 
unscientific, and implausible.” Id. at 32.  Third, the law enforcement agency that oversees
487
 









    
 
 













   
 
 
abuse forensic evidence is high, and courts that admit prosecutorial
forensic science indiscriminately are likely to admit flawed forensic 
evidence.95 
C.  Limitations of the Indigent Criminal Defense System 
   Indigent criminal defendants’ lack of resources also contributes to the 
admission of unreliable prosecutorial expert evidence and its prejudicial 
effect.  In Daubert, the Court predicted that if courts applied the factors 
to admit “shaky but admissible evidence,” the adversarial system’s
conventional devices, including “vigorous” cross-examination and the 
presentation of contrary evidence, would safeguard defendants from the
potential prejudice of such evidence.96  However, this optimistic faith in 
the adversarial system ignores the reality that legal services for indigent 
defendants—the majority of criminal defendants—are seriously
underfunded.97  This underfunding contributes to the failure of criminal 
defendants to succeed in challenging prosecution expert evidence or in
admitting their own.98  The key consequence of the lack of public
criminal defense funding is the difficulty or inability to hire defense
experts.99  In criminal trials involving forensic evidence, “[t]he fact that 
the crime lab has ultimate control over both where to dedicate lab resources and how to 
economically and professionally reward forensic examiners.  Craig M. Cooley, Forensic 
Science and Capital Punishment Reform: An “Intellectually Honest” Assessment, 17
GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 299, 374–75 (2007).  The pro-prosecution bias of forensic 
scientists may not be the only bias leading courts to admit more prosecution expert 
evidence than defense evidence.  Scholars argue that judges also demonstrate pro-
prosecution bias, presuming that most defendants are guilty rather than innocent, which 
leads them to evaluate prosecutorial expert evidence more favorably.  Donald E. Shelton, 
Forensic Science Evidence and Judicial Bias in Criminal Cases, JUDGES’ J., Summer 
2010, at 18, 23–24. 
95. Even forensic examiners who consciously strive to remain neutral despite the
pressure to please prosecutors may in fact fall victim to unconscious bias.  Cooley, supra
note 94, at 378–79.  Because many forensic methods depend on subjective evaluation of 
test results, examiners are susceptible to the “observer effect” phenomenon, under which
individuals’ wants or expectations unconsciously influence their perceptions of an event 
or situation, leading the individuals to perceive test results that conform to the
prosecution’s expectations. Id. at 379. 
96. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993). 
97. Giannelli, supra note 54, at 474.  Modern indigent defense systems, which
began developing in the late 1960s, have always faced severe underfunding.  Douglas W.
Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death 
Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 377 (1995).  Low financial resources result in “shockingly
low” hourly rates and fees for appointed counsel, oppressive caseloads and poor working 
conditions for public defenders, and a lack of adequate funding for defense experts and 
investigators.  Id. at 380, 384, 389, 391. 
98. Findley, supra note 25, at 897. 
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[the defense] may lack adequate resources with which to fully develop 
its case is a constant problem.”100  The Daubert Court’s reliance on the
adversarial system to safeguard defendants from the jury’s reliance on
erroneous science thus fails without defense access to expert assistance.101 
Limited defense access to expert resources undermines defense lawyers’
ability to mount an adequate challenge to prosecutorial experts.102 
Generally, defense counsel does not have the necessary scientific
knowledge base to challenge invalid prosecution expert testimony 
successfully, so the inability to consult an expert to prepare that challenge
may be fatal.103  Further, the criminal defense bar is largely unorganized
compared with the cohesive nature of government prosecutorial systems,
which are better suited to share information and anticipate scientific
issues that may arise in a trial.104  This disparity gives prosecutors the
advantages of a shared knowledge base on forensic issues and the
assistance of specialized units with expertise in forensics, while defense
attorneys litigate forensic challenges with limited experience in trying 
scientific issues and little guidance from peers.105  The success of civil 
defendants in challenging plaintiff expert evidence under Daubert
highlights that underfunding contributes to criminal defendants’ relatively 
low success in challenging prosecutorial expert evidence; research
suggests that civil defendants, who presumably have greater financial 
resources to access expert assistance, win their Daubert challenges most
of the time.106 
100. Jack B. Weinstein, Science, and the Challenges of Expert Testimony in the
Courtroom, 77 OR. L. REV. 1005, 1008 (1998). 
 101. Goebes, supra note 41, at 37–38; see also Paul C. Giannelli, The Right to 
Defense Experts, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2003, at 15, 15 (“The need for experts today—in
a post-DNA, post-Daubert world—is probably self-evident.”). 
102. Munia Jabbar, Note, Overcoming Daubert’s Shortcomings in Criminal Trials:
Making the Error Rate the Primary Factor in Daubert’s Validity Inquiry, 85 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 2034, 2047 (2010) (citing Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 15, at 33). 
 103. Id. (citing Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 15, at 33, 34). 
 104. Findley, supra note 25, at 931. 
 105. Id.  Many public defender systems are organized at the county level, if at all, 
and even statewide public defender systems are less centralized than prosecutorial 
systems. Id.  Additionally, most public defender systems assign member attorneys to 
cases on an as-needed basis, without regard for any special expertise or experience of the
attorney. Id.
 106. Cooley & Oberfield, supra note 16, at 290–92; see also Developments in the 
Law—Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 
1529 (1995) (“Unlike parties in civil cases, defendants in criminal cases often lack the
financial resources to hire their own experts.”).  This creates the “paradox” that in civil 
489
 











     
  
    
 
  









    
    
       
      
  
   
    
Defendants’ lack of expert resources thus leads to a “systemic failure” 
by the criminal defense bar to litigate seriously issues regarding the
scientific validity of prosecutorial expert evidence.107  This failure results in
courts admitting prosecution forensic evidence that may be misleading 
or unreliable.108  Because considerable evidence suggests that juries
implicitly trust expert testimony,109 the admission of dubious scientific
evidence by prosecutors translates into a higher likelihood of false
convictions.110  In short, the adversarial process for the admission of 
cases, where only money is at stake, courts apply a more stringent standard for the
admission of expert evidence than in criminal cases, where a defendant’s life or liberty is
at stake.  Cooley & Oberfield, supra note 16, at 290–92.  For a discussion of how courts 
apply the Daubert standard in various civil cases, see generally Norman D. Bates &
Danielle A. Frank, Premises Security Experts and Admissibility Considerations Under 
Daubert and Kumho: A Revised Standard, 15 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 179
(2010); David E. Bernstein, Keeping Junk Science Out of Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP. 
L. REV. 11 (2003); Neal C. Stout & Peter A. Valberg, Bayes’ Law, Sequential 
Uncertainties, and Evidence of Causation in Toxic Tort Cases, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
781 (2005); Wendy Michelle Ertmer, Note, Just What the Doctor Ordered: The
Admissibility of Differential Diagnosis in Pharmaceutical Product Litigation, 56 VAND. 
L. REV. 1227 (2003); Amanda Hungerford, Note, Back to Basics: Courts’ Treatment of
Agency Animal Studies After Daubert, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2010); and Matthew W.
Swinehart, Note, Remedying Daubert’s Inadequacy in Evaluating the Admissibility of 
Scientific Models Used in Environmental-Tort Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1281 (2008). 
 107. Risinger, supra note 64, at 135. 
 108. Jabbar, supra note 102, at 2047.  I do not mean to suggest that the State 
intentionally offers misleading or unreliable evidence; rather, research increasingly 
shows that the forensic methods utilized in American criminal trials in general are unreliable
or unsubstantiated, see supra notes 69–73, but courts’ admission of significantly more 
prosecutorial than defense forensic evidence suggests that the prosecution is most often
presenting these methods. 
 109. Jabbar, supra note 102, at 2047–48.  Scholars dub the public’s expectation 
that parties will present forensic evidence the “CSI effect” and the idealistic view juries 
have toward the reliability of scientific testimony the “reverse CSI effect,” due to 
expectations formed through watching modern-day forensic crime shows.  Id. at 2048– 
49. The CSI effect misleads jurors, who are not knowledgeable about the limitations of
forensic science in the courtroom, into basing verdicts nearly exclusively on forensic 
evidence, ignoring corroborating or contradicting evidence.  DiFonzo, supra note 94, at 
2. For a further discussion of the CSI effect and its consequences, see Simon A. Cole &
Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: Media and Litigation Crisis in 
Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335 (2009); Craig M. Cooley, The CSI Effect: Its
Impact and Potential Concerns, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 471 (2007); Jessica D. Gabel, 
Forensiphilia: Is Public Fascination with Forensic Science a Love Affair or Fatal 
Attraction?, 36 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 233 (2010); Tamara F. 
Lawson, Before the Verdict and Beyond the Verdict: The CSI Infection Within Modern 
Criminal Jury Trials, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 119 (2009); and Donald E. Shelton, Juror 
Expectations for Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Perceptions and Reality About 
the “CSI Effect” Myth, 27 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 110. See Mark A. Godsey & Marie Alou, She Blinded Me with Science: Wrongful
Convictions and the “Reverse CSI-Effect,” 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 481, 494–98
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scientific evidence established by Daubert is “not suited to the task of 
finding ‘scientific truth’” in criminal trials in light of the disparity in 
resources between the prosecution and the defense to develop expert
evidence.111 
III. INDIGENT DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ASSURED ACCESS TO 
FORENSIC EXPERTS UNDER CURRENT DUE
PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE
Experts are an indispensable part of a party’s case in criminal trials
utilizing the Daubert standard.  Constitutional jurisprudence has evolved 
in recent years to provide indigent criminal defendants with access to
publically funded experts in limited cases.  Despite this progress, courts 
retain discretion to appoint or withhold expert assistance in the majority
of cases and are reluctant to appoint an expert unless the defendant can 
clearly show that the case falls into the narrow scenario confronted in
Ake v. Oklahoma, where a psychiatric defense expert’s opinion was 
indispensable to a capital murder defendant’s insanity defense.112 
A.  Fundamental Fairness Doctrine
   The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.”113  The Constitution extends this due process requirement to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.114  The Supreme Court interprets
the Due Process Clause as guaranteeing fundamental fairness in criminal
proceedings by requiring the Government to take proactive steps to ensure
that indigent defendants have a fair opportunity to present their defenses.115 
The fundamental fairness guarantee provides that the Government cannot 
11:38 AM), http://wlwt.com/Ryan-Widmer-To-Get-New-Murder-Trial/-/9838586/10472
288/-/15f5a4v/-/index.html) (describing examples of cases in which jurors convicted 
defendants based on an “undue reliance on state forensic testimony” and a belief that 
“[t]he CSI-types know what they’re doing—they can solve anything”). 
 111. NAS REPORT, supra note 69, at 12. 
112.  470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985). 
 113. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
 114. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
























   
 
   
  
 
deny a defendant “the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial
proceeding in which his liberty is at stake” because of poverty.116 
A criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if an indigent defendant does 
not have access to the “raw materials integral to the building of an effective 
defense.”117  Further, the State must provide such materials to defendants
who cannot afford them.118 Courts utilize the three-factor balancing test 
the Supreme Court delineated in Mathews v. Eldridge to determine what
raw materials are necessary to an adequate defense.119  Using this test,
the court weighs (1) the private interest at stake in the proceeding; 
(2) the Government’s interest affected by the Government providing the 
defense tool; and (3) the probable value of the defense tool and the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of the individual’s affected interest if the
Government does not provide the defense tool.120 
B.  Defense Experts Are Integral to an Adequate Defense 
   In Ake v. Oklahoma, the Court applied this balancing test to determine 
whether the State violated the defendant’s due process rights when it
 116. Id.  Under this reading of the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court announced a
number of criminal procedure decisions that shaped the contours of modern-day criminal 
trials.  See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (Government must 
ensure that the assistance of appointed counsel is effective); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 
497 (1972) (prosecution barred from racial discrimination when selecting jury); Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (State must share exculpatory evidence with the 
accused); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (Government must 
appoint counsel to assist an indigent defendant at trial); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 
269 (1959) (State cannot allow its witnesses to testify falsely about the compensation
they received in exchange for testifying); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60–61 
(1957) (Government must disclose the identity of an informant if it is relevant and 
helpful to the defense or essential to a fair trial); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19
(1956) (Government must provide a trial transcript to an indigent defendant if one is 
necessary to a defendant’s appeal); cf. Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 162 (2009) (trial 
judge’s good-faith error in denying defendant’s peremptory challenge to a prospective 
juror did not make the trial fundamentally unfair); Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 51 
(1996) (State can prohibit a defendant from presenting evidence on voluntary
intoxication to negate required mental state of crime).
 117. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.  The Court’s fundamental fairness jurisprudence focuses 
on providing indigent defendants with “[m]eaningful access to justice.”  Id.
 118. Id.  The State is obligated to provide indigent defendants with only the tools 
necessary to provide defendants an adequate opportunity to present their claims—not
any and all tools in “the legal arsenal that may be privately retained” by a wealthy 
defendant.  Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974).  For example, the Government 
does not have to appoint counsel for indigent defendants in discretionary state appeals or 
state collateral proceedings after defendants have exhausted direct appellate review.
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556 (1987); Ross, 417 U.S. at 616. 
119.  424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 













   
  
  











   
[VOL. 50:  469, 2013] Sharpening the Tools of an Adequate Defense 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
denied him the appointment of a psychiatrist to help establish an insanity
defense to a capital murder charge.121  The Court found the defendant’s
interest in the accuracy of a criminal proceeding “almost uniquely 
compelling” and the risk of erroneous deprivation of the defendant’s life 
or liberty “extremely high” without the assistance of a psychiatrist.122 
The Court viewed the Government’s economic interest in not providing
a defense expert insubstantial in comparison, especially because the State’s
competing interest in the accuracy and fairness of its criminal adjudications 
weakens its economic concern.123  The Court therefore held that states
are required to assure a defendant access to a psychiatrist to conduct an
examination and assist in the preparation of the defense when the defendant 
demonstrates that the defendant’s sanity at the time of the offense will be 
a significant factor at trial.124 
Although the Court’s narrow holding in Ake v. Oklahoma established 
that due process requires the State to appoint defense experts in some 
cases—specifically in a capital case in which the defendant’s mental
state is significant to the trial outcome—state and lower federal courts
struggle to define its scope and reach.125 One of the key questions courts
must confront is whether they should read Ake as requiring states to
appoint defense experts other than psychiatrists.126  The Court had the
opportunity to address this question in Caldwell v. Mississippi, wherein
 121. Id. at 78–82.  The defendant requested a state-funded psychiatrist to perform 
an evaluation and to assist defense counsel in developing an insanity defense after the 
defendant exhibited odd behavior and signs of psychosis.  Id. at 71–72.  After the trial 
court denied Ake’s request, a jury found Ake guilty of two counts of murder and sentenced 
him to death.  Id. at 73.  Ake did not call a single expert witness to help develop his 
insanity defense at trial or to present evidence mitigating the prosecution’s claim that he 
was a danger to society at the sentencing phase.  Id.  In fact, not a single witness for the 
defense or the prosecution testified about the defendant’s mental state at the time of the 
offense.  Id. at 72.  Regardless, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Ake’s 
conviction and rejected his argument that the State had a responsibility to provide him 
with the assistance of a psychiatrist because he could not afford one.  Id. at 73. 
 122.  Id. at 78, 82. 
 123. Id. at 79. 
 124. Id. at 83. 
 125. Goebes, supra note 41, at 16–23. 
 126. Id. at 18.  Lower courts have also contemplated whether the Ake decision 
extends to noncapital cases, what threshold showing a defendant must make for 
appointment of an expert to be required, whether that showing need be made ex parte to
prevent the defense from revealing its trial strategy to the prosecution, and whether the 
appointed expert must be part of the defense team or can be a neutral expert whose 






    
 
    
     
   















   
 




an indigent defendant convicted of capital murder argued that the trial 
court violated his due process rights by denying his requests for the
appointment of a criminal investigator, a fingerprint expert, and a 
ballistics expert.127  The Court found that the defendant’s “undeveloped
assertions” that such experts would help his defense did not meet the
requisite showing of need to entitle him to appointed assistance as a matter 
of federal constitutional law and abstained from deciding “what if any
showing would have entitled a defendant to the assistance of the type here
sought.”128 This language left open the question of whether due process
ever requires the appointment of forensic experts and if so, under what 
conditions.129 In 2006, the Supreme Court declined to clarify when
and to what extent indigent defendants are entitled to appointed 
forensic experts when it denied certiorari in Moore v. State, refusing to 
review whether the State’s denial of a defendant’s request for a DNA 
expert to help him defend murder charges violated the defendant’s due 
process rights.130 
C.  Courts Fail To Universally Provide for the Appointment of Forensic 
Experts for Indigent Defendants
Lower courts have reached different conclusions regarding when the 
Due Process Clause requires the appointment of forensic experts. 
A majority of jurisdictions have concluded that the right to expert assistance
recognized in Ake is not limited to assistance from psychiatrists.131  In  
some cases, courts have applied Ake to require states to appoint forensic 
experts, including ballistics experts,132 DNA experts,133 forensic dentists,134 
127.  472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985). 
 128. Id. (emphasis added). 
129. Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan urged the Court to resolve the issue in a
dissent to the Court’s decision to deny certiorari in Johnson v. Oklahoma.  484 U.S. 878, 
880 (1987) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).  An indigent defendant appealed a trial 
court’s rejection of his request for the appointment of a chemist to challenge the testimony of
the prosecution’s key witness, a police chemist, and to conduct an electrophoresis test. 
Id. at 878.  Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan believed the case demonstrated “the
pressing need to consider and resolve” the questions of “whether and when an indigent
defendant is entitled to nonpsychiatric expert assistance.” Id. at 880.  The other members of
the Court disagreed and left the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment and the 
defendant’s death sentence undisturbed.  Id. at 878. 
130.  549 U.S. 813 (2006), denying cert. to 889 A.2d 325 (Md. 2005). 
 131. Moore v. State, 889 A.2d 325, 337–38 (listing twenty-two jurisdictions extending 
Ake to nonpsychiatric experts). 
132. Scott v. Louisiana, 934 F.2d 631, 633 (5th Cir. 1991); Ex parte Sanders, 612 
So. 2d 1199, 1202 (Ala. 1993). 
 133. Dubose v. State, 662 So. 2d 1189, 1994 (Ala. 1995); Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d
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fingerprint and shoe print experts,135 and forensic pathologists to determine
cause of death.136 
However, these cases do not establish a universally recognized
constitutional right to the assistance of forensic experts for indigent
defendants.137  Recently, in Babick v. Berghuis, the Sixth Circuit recognized 
that whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Ake extends to nonpsychiatric
experts remains an open question.138  The Fourth Circuit, Fifth Circuit,
Eleventh Circuit, and multiple federal district courts have similarly
concluded that Ake does not clearly require the appointment of defense 
experts outside of the psychiatric context.139  Likewise, some states, 
including Oklahoma and Virginia, refuse to read Ake as requiring the 
appointment of nonpsychiatric experts.140 
Even in jurisdictions that recognize that Ake may provide criminal
defendants with a constitutional right to the assistance of a defense expert 
v. State, 612 So. 2d 381, 393 (Miss. 1992); Taylor v. State, 939 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
134.  Thornton v. State, 339 S.E.2d 240, 240–41 (Ga. 1986). 
135. People v. Lawson, 644 N.E.2d 1172, 1192 (Ill. 1994); State v. Carmouche, 
527 So. 2d 307, 307 (La. 1988); State v. Bridges, 385 S.E.2d 337, 339 (N.C. 1989). 
136. Terry v. Rees, 985 F.2d 283, 284 (6th Cir. 1993).  Courts extending Ake past 
psychiatric experts interpret it to require the State to appoint a wide range of nonforensic 
experts as well. See, e.g., Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 313 (10th Cir. 1992) (expert 
on battered woman syndrome); Doe v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 893 (Ct. 
App. 1995) (posttraumatic stress disorder expert); Bright v. State, 455 S.E.2d 37, 50 (Ga. 
1995) (toxicologist); Crawford v. State, 362 S.E.2d 201, 205–06 (Ga. 1987) (survey
expert); James v. State, 613 N.E.2d 15, 21 (Ind. 1993) (blood splatter expert); People v.
Tyson, 618 N.Y.S.2d 796, 797 (App. Div. 1994) (voiceprint expert); State v. Rogers, 836 
P.2d 1308, 1315 (Or. 1992) (en banc) (opinion polling expert).  Many of these cases rely
on Little v. Armontrout, which concluded,
There is no principled way to distinguish between psychiatric and nonpsychiatric 
experts.  The question in each case must be not what field of science or expert 
knowledge is involved, but rather how important the scientific issue is in the 
case, and how much help a defense expert could have given.
835 F.2d 1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 137. See 1 CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 10:10 (2012), available at Westlaw 
CRPMAN. 
138.  620 F.3d 571, 579 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 139. See, e.g., Briseno v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 204, 209 (5th Cir. 2001); Weeks v. 
Angelone, 176 F.3d 249, 264–65 (4th Cir. 1999); Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501, 1511
n.24 (11th Cir. 1995); Kittrell v. Davis, No. 2:08-CV-11256, 2010 WL 4539458, at *15 
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 3, 2010); Griffin v. Howes, No. 1:07-CV-14402, 2009 WL 211172, at 
*2–3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 27, 2009). 
140. Williamson v. State, 812 P.2d 384, 395 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991); O’Dell v. 


































   
 
     
 
other than a psychiatrist, defendants are not assured the right to a
forensic expert in any given case.141  In fact, research suggests that trial
courts take a “restrictive approach” in appointing experts to indigent
defendants.142  Many courts interpret Ake to require the appointment of a
defense expert only after the defendant proves there is a reasonable 
probability that the requested expert would assist the defense and that
denying the expert’s assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair 
trial.143 
Forcing defendants to make this showing deprives them of expert 
assistance in cases in which it is integral to their defenses in two ways. 
First, the high “fundamentally unfair” threshold disadvantages defendants 
because it requires them to prove fundamental unfairness in a trial that
has not yet occurred.144  Second, the requirement that a defendant show a
reasonable probability that the expert would assist the defense requires 
the defendant to prove what the requested expert would say and do if 
appointed.145  However, without access to such an expert, the defendant 
has no way of learning what evidence the expert could provide that would 
be helpful at trial.146  The requisite factual showing therefore places
defendants in a “Catch-22,” where without access to an expert, the 
141.  See Goebes, supra note 41, at 25 (“As illustrated by the Oregon and Virginia
statutes, the right to expert assistance . . . varies greatly from state to state and may vary
in important ways from the right to expert assistance guaranteed by Ake.”). 
142. Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a 
Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1312 (2004).  A 1990 
investigation by the National Law Journal of capital murder defendants in the South
revealed that judges routinely deny defense counsel requests for expert and investigative 
fees.  Id. (quoting Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation’s 
Death Belt, NAT’L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30).  Similarly, a 1992 study of the indigent 
defense system by the National Center for State Courts found that the greatest disparities 
between prosecutors and defenders for the indigent continue to be in the areas of 
investigators and expert witnesses.  Id. (quoting ROGER A. HANSON ET AL., INDIGENT 
DEFENDERS: GET THE JOB DONE AND DONE WELL 100 (1992)). 
143. Jennifer M. Allen, Free for All a Free for All: The Supreme Court’s Abdication of
Duty in Failing To Establish Standards for Indigent Defense, 27 LAW & INEQ. 365, 389– 
90 (2009).  This test originated in Moore v. Kemp, wherein the Eleventh Circuit
interpreted the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ake and Caldwell to require defendants to 
demonstrate “something more than a mere possibility of assistance from a requested
expert” and formulated the test to define what showing the defendant must make to
obtain the requested assistance. 809 F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 144. Allen, supra note 143, at 390. This standard requires the defendant “to show 
that his or her trial will go or would have gone differently but for inadequate assistance,” 
despite the fact that the defendant cannot yet know what would happen at trial. Id.
 145. See Emily J. Groendyke, Note, Ake v. Oklahoma: Proposals for Making the 
Right a Reality, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 377 (2007). 
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defendant cannot make the showing required to obtain expert assistance.147 
Thus, defendants may be unable to make the requisite threshold showing 
to obtain expert assistance even though such assistance is integral to 
their defenses.148 
Accordingly, courts’ current interpretation of Ake does not assure
indigent criminal defendants the constitutional right to the assistance of a 
forensic expert, even when the prosecution relies heavily on forensic
evidence, which is when defendants need such assistance the most.
Supreme Court clarification is necessary to ensure the protection of 
defendants’ fundamental rights.
IV. CASES ARISING OUT OF A CHILD’S DEATH UNIQUELY REQUIRE 
ACCESS TO EXPERTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
Although the shortcomings of the Daubert standard, coupled with 
indigent defendants’ lack of access to forensic experts, may lead to wrongful 
convictions in other criminal cases,149 certain properties of child death 
cases make the admission of flawed forensic science most damaging in 
these cases, necessitating the Supreme Court’s recognition that the State 
must provide defense experts to indigent defendants in such cases.  First,
 147. Id. (citing Moore, 809 F.2d at 742 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)). 
 148. Id. at 380 (theorizing that the factual showing requirement undermines Ake’s 
aim of providing indigent defendants with expert assistance when needed by shifting the 
burden of proving an unfair trial to the defendant).
 149. See generally Joëlle Anne Moreno, Einstein on the Bench?: Exposing What 
Judges Do Not Know About Science and Using Child Abuse Cases To Improve how
Courts Evaluate Scientific Evidence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 531 (2003) (reviewing failure of
Daubert to yield accurate results in criminal cases involving child abuse allegations); 
Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some
Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107 (2005) (discussing how Daubert
leads to a variety of wrongful convictions); James T. Richardson et al., The Problems of 
Applying Daubert to Psychological Syndrome Evidence, 79 JUDICATURE 10 (1995) 
(exploring Daubert’s contribution to admission of psychological syndrome evidence in
child abuse, sexual abuse, domestic violence, and rape cases); Jean Coleman Blackerby,
Note, Life After Death Row: Preventing Wrongful Capital Convictions and Restoring 
Innocence After Exoneration, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1179 (2003) (discussing factors that 
have contributed to wrongful capital murder convictions, including “faulty forensic 
science, prosecutorial and police misconduct, racial prejudice, inadequate defense 
counsel, and mental incompetence”); Jessica M. Sombat, Note, Latent Justice: Daubert’s
Impact on the Evaluation of Fingerprint Identification Testimony, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2819 (2002) (examining the role of Daubert’s failure to screen misleading fingerprint 










   
  













    
 
    




    
 
 
like all murder cases, the stakes in child death cases are high as the
offense is commonly punishable by life in prison or the death penalty.150 
However, apart from other murder cases, child death cases carry the 
unique social stigma of labeling the defendant a “child killer.”151  Because
of the uniquely devastating nature of the sudden and unexpected death of
a child,152 the stigma accompanying child death accusations can follow
the wrongfully accused long after exoneration.153  The nature of child
death investigations, which are likely to revolve around one of two suspects, 
also heightens their stakes.154 The accused killer is often a parent, meaning 
that false accusations have the potential to tear a family apart.155  Authorities
are likely to remove the parent’s other children from the parent’s care 
until the case is resolved, which can take years, even if the parent defendant 
 150. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A1.1 (2012). 
 151. GOUDGE, supra note 17, at 4. 
 152. See id. at 3–4 (describing the impact on the community of a suspicious death 
of a child); see also James A. Manning, Sudden, Unexpected Death in Children, 131 AM. 
J. DISEASES CHILD. 1201, 1201 (1977) (“The sudden and unexpected death of a 
previously healthy child is an event unexceeded in its capacity to induce feelings of
tragedy, awe, and incomprehensibility.”).  The recent trial of Casey Anthony, a young 
mother accused of killing her two-year-old daughter, vividly demonstrates how the 
unexpected death of a child elicits strong emotional reactions from family, neighbors,
and even strangers.  The disappearance of Anthony’s daughter in 2008 “transfixed 
America for three years” while Americans and the media debated Anthony’s guilt or 
innocence.  Lizette Alvarez, Florida Mother Is Found Not Guilty of Murder, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 6, 2011, at A1.  When a jury acquitted Anthony of murder on July 5, 2011, the 
public responded with shock and outrage.  Suzan Clarke, Casey Anthony Verdict: Anthony
Family Gets Death Threats in Wake of Acquittal, Asks for Privacy, ABC NEWS (July 5, 
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/casey-anthony-verdict-anthony-family-death-threats-
wake/story?id=14004306.  Reactions from spectators ranged from tears to death threats 
against the Anthony family.  Id.  The public and media’s fixation with the Anthony case 
continued more than six months later, with news outlets continuing to report details of 
the case and Anthony’s reported whereabouts.  See, e.g., Keith Ablow, What Casey 
Anthony’s Psychiatry Records Tell Us—Did Casey Really Kill Caylee?, FOX NEWS (Jan. 
19, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/01/19/what-casey-anthonys-psychiatry-
records-tell-us-did-casey-really-kill-caylee/ (detailing the contents of Anthony’s mental 
health records released by the court); Anthony Colarossi, Judge Says Casey Anthony Must
Answer Limited Questions, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 18, 2012), http://articles.orlando 
sentinel.com/2012-01-18/news/os-casey-anthony-order-20120118_1_casey-anthony-
george-anthony-jose-baez (reporting on judge’s order that Anthony answer limited
questions in civil case). 
 153. See Stephanie Armour, Wrongly Convicted Walk Away with Scars, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 13, 2004, 2:16 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/workplace/ 
2004-10-13-dna-exonerated-jobs_x.htm (discussing postexoneration experience of first
death row prisoner exonerated of murder of nine-year-old girl by DNA evidence, 
including difficulty finding work and neighbors’ ostracizing behavior). 
 154. GOUDGE, supra note 17, at 3–4. 
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is innocent.156 Meanwhile, the children have to face “the horror that the
parent they love is suspected of killing a brother or sister.”157  Moreover,
questions over the parent’s guilt may permanently divide a family
struggling to find answers.158  Alternatively, when a caregiver or babysitter 
is accused, the suspect is often young, and fighting the accusation often
changes the course of the suspect’s life, even if the suspect avoids
conviction.159 
Second, forensic evidence in child death cases is uniquely important in 
that the prosecution often builds its case on the only two pieces of 
evidence available: (1) the last person in contact with the child preceding 
the child’s death and (2) a forensic pathologist or other medical expert’s 
determination of the cause of death.160  Adult murders tend to occur in
public places, where witnesses may be available, and involve weapons 
that leave distinct wounds.161  In contrast, children most often die from
injuries caused without a weapon and in the privacy of a home, leaving 
little additional evidence for the prosecution to build its case on or for 
the defense to use to dispute expert testimony.162  Because symptoms of 
child abuse can mirror innocent causes of death, such as preexisting 
medical conditions, it is not always clear when a child dies that a crime
even occurred.163  Therefore, the forensic expert’s cause of death 
156.  Id.; see also Lee et al., supra note 3 (describing five cases in which parents 
falsely accused of murdering their own child lost custody of their other children). 
 157. GOUDGE, supra note 17, at 3. 
 158. See id.
 159. See id. at 3–4.  For example, seventeen-year-old Joyce Billsland faced murder
charges after a ten-month-old child died at her childcare center.  Bob Merrifield, Baby-
sitter: Tot’s Death Made Me a Victim, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14, 1989, at 2C1.  While facing 
charges, she lost custody of her daughter.  Id. Although a jury acquitted Billsland, the 
stigma of the charges against her permanently changed her community’s perception of
her and her life. Id.
 160. GOUDGE, supra note 17, at 4; see also WALSH, supra note 17, at 6 (“Because
most fatal child maltreatment cases lack witnesses or any direct evidence tying a specific 
individual to the crime, these cases may often depend on circumstantial evidence.”). 
161.  Thompson et al., supra note 18. 
162.  Id.; see also WALSH, supra note 17, at 4–5. 
163. Thompson et al., supra note 18; see also WALSH, supra note 17, at 1 (noting 
that when an investigation of a child’s death is flawed, an innocent person will be 
suspected or accused of a crime that did not occur or for which no one is responsible); 
Matthew D. Ramsey, A Nuts and Bolts Approach To Litigating the Shaken Baby or 
Shaken Impact Syndrome, 188 MIL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006) (“Publicised court cases, with
widely divergent medical opinions, illustrate the dilemma of distinguishing between




















   








   
determination becomes critical to whether a suspect is charged or
convicted.164  Thus, the testimony of prosecution expert witnesses plays
a larger role in these cases than in cases involving other forms of 
evidence, and the admission of misleading prosecutorial expert testimony 
is correspondingly more likely to lead to wrongful convictions because 
of its increased weight.165 
Finally, two factors make the possibility of error in cause of death 
determinations higher in child death cases than in other murder cases.166 
First, determining the cause of an infant or young child’s death presents 
particular challenges because of the differences in bodily functions of 
physically mature adults and physically developing children.167  Therefore,
it is difficult for forensic or medical examiners that do not specialize in 
pediatrics to detect subtle signs of trauma or illness.168  Second, the
community’s sense of outrage and urgent need to understand what 
happened in a child’s death169 can increase the pressure on experts to 
find an answer, leading to a mindset of approaching every child death as
“homicide until proven otherwise.”170  This social pressure adds to the
preexisting relationship between medical examiners and law enforcement to
reinforce pro-prosecutorial bias.171 
The unique challenges presented by child death cases intersect with the
Daubert standard’s failure to screen out misleading prosecution expert 
testimony without adequate defense challenges, resulting in wrongful
convictions.  Four categories of child death cases illustrate how the 
admission of unsubstantiated medical expert testimony under Daubert
leads to wrongful convictions: (1) Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS), (2) bite 
mark identification, (3) asphyxiation, and (4) examiner bias or incompetence 
an uncorroborated, alleged accident, often a fall.” (quoting Barry Wilkins, Head Injury— 
Abuse or Accident?, 76 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 393, 393 (1997))). 
 164. GOUDGE, supra note 17, at 4. 
165. Molly Gena, Comment, Shaken Baby Syndrome: Medical Uncertainty Casts
Doubt on Convictions, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 701, 705–06 (concluding that infant deaths can
lead to homicide convictions of innocent people based solely on medical opinions and 
the fact that the accused was with the baby when it became fatally ill).
 166. See Thompson et al., supra note 18. 
167.  Id. 
 168. Id.
 169. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
170.  Thompson et al., supra note 18; see also Ramsey, supra note 163, at 2 
(describing child death cases as creating a “highly-charged atmosphere where emotions 
and the personal agendas of the purported experts can run roughshod over logic, science,
and the law”); Daniel G. Orenstein, Comment, Shaken to the Core: Emerging Scientific
Opinion and Post-Conviction Relief in Cases of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 42 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 1305, 1305 (2011) (“A child is dead.  Justice demands an explanation, someone to 
hold responsible for the loss of an innocent life.”). 
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leading to false findings of abuse.172  In these cases, access to defense 
experts would have allowed the defendants to better challenge the 
prosecution’s flawed forensic evidence that led to their convictions. 
A.  Shaken Baby Syndrome 
Cases involving SBS illustrate the prejudicial role forensic testimony 
plays against criminal defendants in child death cases.  SBS first emerged in
the scientific community in 1972 when medical experts characterized the 
presence of three injuries in an infant as a unique triad of symptoms:
(1) bleeding between the middle layer and the outermost or innermost 
layer of the brain, (2) retinal bleeding of the eyes caused by a ruptured
blood vessel, and (3) brain swelling.173  Researchers concluded that these
symptoms could only result from someone violently shaking an infant 
back and forth and termed them SBS.174  Over the next thirty years, 
hundreds to thousands of criminal prosecutions proceeded on this theory, 
many resulting in convictions.175 
 172. See Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 05CV1568 WQH (NLS), 2007 WL 
173864 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2007) (examiner incompetence); Brewer v. State, 1999-DR-
00589-SCT (Miss. 2002) (bite mark identification); Brooks v. State, 98-KA-00322-SCT 
(Miss. 1999) (bite mark identification); Robbins v. State, 360 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011) (asphyxiation); Ex parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) 
(asphyxiation); State v. Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, 308 Wis. 2d 374, 746 N.W.2d 590
(SBS); Lee et al., supra note 3 (discussing additional unpublished cases involving 
wrongful convictions and false accusations involving a child’s death). 
 173. Gena, supra note 165, at 707.  The medical terms for the symptoms of SBS 
are (1) a subdural or subarachnoid hematoma, (2) retinal hemorrhaging, and (3) brain
swelling.  Id.  Pediatric radiologist Dr. John Caffey developed the modern theory of SBS 
in the early 1970s when he reviewed twenty-seven cases in which a caretaker or 
eyewitnesses confirmed that someone shook an infant before its death.  Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Genuine Battle of the Scientific (And Non-
Scientific) Experts, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 156, 164 (2010).  Dr. Caffey concluded from these
cases that manual shaking of an infant is the common primary cause of SBS’s three 
symptoms. Id. at 165. 
 174. Gena, supra note 165, at 707. 
 175. Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome
and the Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2009) (projecting the number of 
SBS prosecutions at 200 per year but acknowledging the difficulty of providing an exact 
number).  The theory reached wide acceptance in both the medical and legal communities in a
relatively short time, aided by a lack of research investigating its invalidity or validating 
competing theories.  Ramsey, supra note 163, at 8.  Convictions based on SBS began 
appearing in the early 1980s.  See People v. Kailey, 662 P.2d 168, 170 (Colo. 1983) (en
banc); State v. Schneider, C.A. No. L-84-214, 1984 WL 3719, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 
21, 1984).  Many jurisdictions accepted testimony on SBS without closely examining its 
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The SBS diagnosis is a powerful tool for the prosecution.  The classic 
SBS diagnosis holds that a severely shaken child immediately displays
signs of trauma, including unconsciousness.176  Experts testifying on SBS
theory can therefore effectively “time stamp” the child’s injuries and
incriminate the last adult who was in contact with the child as the
perpetrator of the child’s injuries.177  Accordingly, SBS expert testimony 
establishes nearly the entire case for the prosecution: “timing the injury 
determines the identity of the perpetrator, and the high level of force 
required establishes both causation and the mens rea of at least 
recklessness.”178 
However, recent research indicates that despite its widespread acceptance, 
SBS testimony may lack a valid scientific basis.  In the mid- to late-1990s, 
doctors subjected SBS theory to heightened scrutiny because of a
widespread shift in how medical professionals derive their research.179 
A comprehensive effort to examine the science underlying SBS revealed
that published literature on SBS contained inadequate scientific evidence 
to support any firm conclusion on whether human shaking actually 
causes the triad of symptoms.180  Recent studies indicate that preexisting 
validity.  See, e.g., Dabbs v. State, 518 So. 2d 825, 826–27 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); 
Jones v. State, 439 S.E.2d 645, 647 (Ga. 1994); People v. Rader, 651 N.E.2d 258, 260
(Ill. App. Ct. 1995); State v. Olson, 435 N.W.2d 530, 531–32 (Minn. 1989); State v.
Wojcik, 472 N.W.2d 732, 734 (Neb. 1991); State v. Weeks, 582 N.E.2d 614, 615 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1989); State v. Lopez, 412 S.E.2d 390, 393 (S.C. 1991); State v. Rundle, 500
N.W.2d 916, 918 (Wis. 1993); see also Joseph D. Hatina, Note, Shaken Baby Syndrome:
Who Are the True Experts?, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 557, 575–76 (1998) (discussing legal 
acceptance of SBS without close examination of the theory).  SBS gained the American
media and public’s attention in the trial of Louise Woodward, a British nanny convicted 
of murder by a jury for allegedly shaking an eight-month-old boy in her care. See
Commonwealth v. Woodward, 694 N.E.2d 1277, 1281 (Mass. 1998).  The trial judge 
reduced Woodward’s conviction to involuntary manslaughter based on lack of malice 
and sentenced her to 279 days in prison, which she had already served while awaiting
trial and action on her postconviction motion for postjudgment relief. Id.  Lawmakers
responded to the Woodward case by passing legislation to prevent SBS.  Gena, supra
note 165, at 710. 
 176. Imwinkelried, supra note 173, at 167–68. 
 177. Id. at 168 (citing Ramsey, supra note 163, at 11–12). 
 178. Orenstein, supra note 170, at 1311.  Mens rea is the mental state that expresses the
intent necessary for any given act to be classified as a crime and is usually an essential
element of any criminal offense.  21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 117 (2d ed. 2008). 
 179. Tuerkheimer, supra note 175, at 12. 
 180. Id. (citing Mark Donohoe, Evidence-Based Medicine and Shaken Baby 
Syndrome: Part I: Literature Review, 1966–1998, 24 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY
239, 239 (2003)); see also State v. Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, ¶ 23, 308 Wis. 2d 374, 
746 N.W.2d 590, 598–99 (stating that “there has been a shift in mainstream medical 
opinion” as to the causes of the symptoms of SBS); Imwinkelried, supra note 173, at 162
(noting that the proposition that shaking by an adult can cause an infant’s brain to 
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conditions, short falls, or accidental injuries can cause these symptoms,
and biomechanical research casts further doubt on the SBS diagnosis by 
suggesting that shaking a baby at the force necessary to inflict the triad
of injuries associated with SBS would cause detectable head or neck 
injuries.181  Additionally, recent research undermines the reliability of
testimony time stamping a child’s injuries, as studies indicate that infants
might have a lucid interval after suffering an injury, making it difficult 
or impossible to precisely pinpoint the time of injury.182 
Nonetheless, advances in SBS research have not led courts to reexamine 
the reliability of SBS testimony.  Criticisms within the medical and scientific 
community over the validity of SBS theory and the empirical flaws of its 
research basis should raise questions about its admissibility under Daubert, 
including whether it is generally accepted and whether it has passed
empirical testing.  However, recent trial court decisions rejected defense
arguments that SBS testimony may not be reliable because it is not 
generally accepted in the medical community, that reliable scientific
methods do not form its basis, and that its error rate is unknown.183 In 
fact, most courts continue to admit SBS testimony routinely,184 relying 
on its previous general acceptance in the medical community and its 
wide acceptance by other trial courts to establish its validity.185
   Despite defendants’ general lack of success challenging the validity of 
SBS, a recent landmark appellate case demonstrates how defense experts 
can effectively defend SBS claims by the prosecution.  In 2008, in State 
v. Edmunds,186 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals became the first court to 
recognize that a prosecution’s expert testimony on SBS may have 
the subject of a sharp, ongoing controversy”); Gena, supra note 165, at 710 (“Today,
there is no consensus among medical professionals as to whether the symptoms that have
traditionally been attributed to SBS are necessarily indicative of intentional shaking.”);
Orenstein, supra note 170, at 1312 (observing that criticism of SBS has progressed from 
a fringe view to a recognized alternative theory). 
 181. Gena, supra note 165, at 711. 
 182. Imwinkelried, supra note 173, at 168; Gena, supra note 165, at 712; Orenstein,
supra note 170, at 1314. 
183. Middleton v. State, 2007-KA-01023-COA (¶ 5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); State 
v. Leibhart, 662 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Neb. 2003); see also Tuerkheimer, supra note 175, at 
33–34 (discussing court reactions to defense challenges to SBS testimony). 
 184. Imwinkelried, supra note 173, at 169. 
 185. Tuerkheimer, supra note 175, at 33. 











    


















prejudiced a defendant’s conviction.187  A jury convicted Audrey Edmunds
of first-degree reckless homicide in 1997 after the prosecution’s medical
experts testified that SBS caused a seven-month-old child’s death and 
that the child’s injuries occurred while Edmunds was the sole person
watching her.188  Edmunds petitioned for a new trial and presented
testimony from six medical experts explaining the debate in the scientific 
community over the validity of SBS.189 The court concluded that the
emergence of a “legitimate and scientific dispute within the medical
community” constituted newly discovered evidence, which created a 
reasonable probability that jurors would have reasonable doubts about 
Edmunds’s guilt if they heard both sides of the SBS dispute.190  The  
State of Wisconsin declined to retry Edmunds and released her from 
prison after she served ten years and 352 days.191 
Although Edmunds’s release is a positive indication of the potential
for postconviction relief for individuals wrongly accused of killing a 
child through SBS,192 it does not signal that courts will reexamine 
the admissibility of SBS testimony at the trial court level.  As the court’s
holding makes clear, the admission of defense expert testimony challenging
SBS at trial could have prevented Edmunds’s wrongful conviction.193 
The ability of the defense to present an alternative, innocent explanation 
for a child’s injuries to counter the prosecution’s SBS testimony decreases 
the prejudicial value of SBS testimony and the likelihood of a wrongful 
conviction.194 Yet this “battle of the experts”195 is unlikely to occur given 
the inadequate resources of defendants.196  Instead, trial courts are likely 
to continue to admit the prosecution’s expert testimony on SBS with few 
challenges from the defense, even fewer of which will be successful.
Based on the prejudicial nature of this testimony, wrongful SBS-based
 187. Tuerkheimer, supra note 175, at 50 (describing State v. Edmunds as “a remarkable
opinion without judicial precedent”). 
 188.  Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d at 592–93. 
 189. Id. at 593. 
 190. Id. at 599. 
191. Melanie Radzicki McManus, Oh, Baby, MADISON MAG. (July 2009), http:// 
www.madisonmagazine.com/Madison-Magazine/July-2009/Oh-Baby/. 
 192. But see Grant v. Warden, No. TSRCV030004233S, 2008 WL 2447272, at *15 
(Conn. June 4, 2008) (denying writ of habeas corpus petition of defendant convicted of
reckless manslaughter in the first degree based on prosecution’s expert testimony concluding 
that four-month-old baby left in defendant’s care died of SBS and rejecting defendant’s 
claim that SBS is not recognized in the scientific community as “unsubstantiated and 
wholly without merit”).
193.  Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d at 599. 
 194. Imwinkelried, supra note 173, at 199–200. 
 195. Id. at 200. 
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convictions are likely to continue under the Daubert standard unless 
defendants have access to experts who can dispute it.197 
B.  Bite Mark Identification Evidence 
A second category of cases demonstrating the need for the appointment of
defense experts in child death cases to counter invalid prosecution forensic 
evidence are those involving bite mark identifications.198  Courts routinely 
admit bite mark identification testimony under Daubert despite its lack
of empirical support and potentially high rate of error.199  This evidence, 
although “lacking theoretical or empirical foundations . . . . enables forensic 
scientists to draw bold, definitive conclusions that can make or break
cases.”200
   Brooks v. State201 and Brewer v. State202 demonstrate the highly 
prejudicial effect bite mark identification testimony has in cases involving a
child’s death.  In January 1992, a jury convicted Levon Brooks of
murdering a three-year-old girl.203  The court sentenced him to life in 
prison.204  In his appeal, Brooks challenged the trial court’s admission of
the prosecution’s expert testimony of Dr. Michael West, a forensic
odontologist who testified that an allegedly human bite mark found on
the child eliminated everyone except Brooks as a suspect.205  Brooks
argued that bite mark evidence is unreliable because no guidelines exist 
for how to match bite marks to an individual.206  The Mississippi Supreme 
Court rejected this argument and affirmed Brooks’s conviction, holding
that bite mark identification is affirmatively admissible in Mississippi.207 
197. Without evidence of the controversy surrounding SBS before it, a jury
essentially has to disbelieve the State’s medical experts to have a reasonable doubt about 
a defendant’s guilt.  See Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d at 599.  Given the jury’s tendency to 
trust medical expert testimony implicitly, this is unlikely to occur.  See Jabbar, supra
note 102, at 2047–48.
 198. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
200.  Saks & Koehler, supra note 47, at 892. 
201.  98-KA-00322-SCT (Miss. 1999). 
202.  1999-DR-00589-SCT (Miss. 2002). 
 203.  Brooks, 98-KA-00322-SCT at ¶¶ 1, 27. 
 204. Id. at ¶ 1.
 205. Id. at ¶¶ 9–12. 
 206. Id. at ¶ 14.  Dr. Steven Hayne, the medical examiner who performed the 
autopsy, relied heavily on Dr. West’s opinion to conclude in his autopsy report that the 
girl’s death was a homicide.  See id. at ¶ 9.
207.  Id. at ¶¶ 11, 51. 
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice McRae criticized the court’s “apparent 
willingness to allow West to testify to anything and everything” as
“expedient for prosecutors but . . . harmful to the criminal justice system.”208 
A forensic pathologist asked to review the case by the Innocence Project,
a national litigation and public policy organization,209 concluded that
there was no scientific basis for West’s conclusion that the victim’s
marks were human bite marks, let alone caused by Brooks.210  Yet the
court did not exonerate Brooks for the murder until a third party, Justin 
Albert Johnson, confessed to the murder in 2008.211  The State then released
Brooks, sixteen years after he entered prison for a murder he did not
commit.212 
Similarly, in 2002, the Mississippi Supreme Court relied on Brooks v.
State to reject Kennedy Brewer’s motion for a new trial.213  Brewer 
claimed that newly discovered evidence undermined the reliability of 
testimony Dr. West gave in his capital murder trial.214  In Brewer’s trial, 
Dr. West testified that bite marks found on the body of a three-year-old
girl matched Brewer’s teeth.215  In his motion for a new trial, Brewer 
introduced a study from the American Board of Forensic Odontology, 
 208. Id. at ¶ 67 (McRae, J., dissenting). 
209. The Innocence Project is a nonprofit legal clinic dedicated to using DNA 
testing to exonerate wrongfully convicted individuals.  About the Innocence Project, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/ (last visited July 15, 
2013).  It is one participant in an “innocence revolution” spawned by forensic DNA 
testing and postconviction DNA exonerations.  See Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence 
Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573, 573 (2004).  Proponents 
of the movement argue that DNA testing exposed the fallibility of evidence used to 
obtain convictions.  Id. at 574.  Critics of the innocence movement fear that it distorts the
need for criminal justice reform by focusing disproportionately on defendants who can 
be exonerated by objective evidence. See Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project: A 
Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Growing Anxiety About Innocence Projects, 13 U. PA. J.L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 315, 323 (2010).  North Carolina offered an alternative solution for
addressing wrongful convictions and DNA exonerations by establishing an independent 
“innocence inquiry commission” to investigate state prisoners’ claims of innocence. 
Jerome M. Maiatico, Note, All Eyes on Us: A Comparative Critique of the North Carolina 
Innocence Inquiry Commission, 56 DUKE L.J. 1345, 1346 (2007) (citing H.R. 1323, 
148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2006)).
 210. Lee et al., supra note 3.  Marks resembling bite marks often occur after death
by decomposition or aquatic wildlife where, as here, the victim’s body was found in a 
body of water. Id.  Justice McRae’s dissent hints at similar conclusions by other experts 
who were “unwilling to testify that the marks could only be bite marks and not something 
else.” Brooks, 98-KA-00322-SCT at ¶ 59 (McRae, J., dissenting).
211. Lee et al., supra note 3. 
 212. Id.
213.  Brewer v. State, 1999-DR-00589-SCT (¶¶ 25–28) (Miss. 2002). 
 214. Id. at ¶¶ 6, 23.  The prosecution called Dr. West to testify as a bite mark 
expert in both Brooks’s and Brewer’s cases. Id.; Brooks, 98-KA-00322-SCT at ¶¶ 9–12. 
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which outlined the shortcomings of bite mark evidence and its high error 
rate.216  The court found it “highly inappropriate to overrule well-established 
precedent” based on this as-of-yet unpublished study, despite the questions
it should have raised about the admissibility of bite mark identification
evidence under Daubert.217 In 2008, when Justin Albert Johnson—the
same person who committed the murder that Brooks was convicted of— 
confessed to the murder for which Brewer was serving a life sentence,
Brewer was also freed after spending sixteen years in prison.218 
Both cases demonstrate how a defense forensic expert could have
challenged Dr. West’s claims at a pretrial Daubert admissibility hearing
or at trial.  These cases demonstrate that without a strong defense attack 
on such evidence, judges are reluctant to scrutinize routinely admitted
scientific evidence like bite mark identifications, even in high-stakes cases
involving a child’s death.219  Additionally, courts’ unwillingness to overturn 
precedent makes it unlikely that defendants can successfully challenge the 
admissibility of bite mark evidence on appeal.220  Wrongful convictions
will thus continue to result from flawed bite mark evidence if defendants 
do not have access to experts who can help them build a successful
attack on such evidence. 
C.  Asphyxiation 
Defense experts are also necessary to confront misleading prosecutorial 
evidence in cases involving asphyxiation.  Even compared with other 
child death cases, determining exactly how the death of a child occurred 
 216. Id. at ¶ 23. 
 217. Id. at ¶ 25.  The court granted Brewer an evidentiary hearing to prove that
newly discovered DNA evidence warranted a new trial. Id. at ¶ 28.  He spent another 
five years in prison awaiting a second trial.  Lee et al., supra note 3. 
218. Lee et al., supra note 3.  Law enforcement originally suspected Johnson of the 
three-year-old’s murder but instead focused on Brewer as a suspect based on Dr. West’s 
bite mark finding.  Id.  This is an example of how the admission of misleading forensic 
evidence in cases involving a child death bears another heavy cost on society: a killer 
goes unpunished or remains free to kill again.  GOUDGE, supra note 17, at 4.
 219. See, e.g., Hill v. City of Chi., No. 06 C 6772, 2011 WL 2461362, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. June 20, 2011); People v. Wright, No. 179564, 1999 WL 33446496, at *1 (Mich. Ct. 
App. Apr. 23, 1999); Howard v. State, 2003-DR-01881-SCT (¶ 53) (Miss. 2006); 
Garrison v. State, 2004 OK CR 35, ¶¶ 62–69, 103 P.3d 590, 603–04; State v. Armstrong, 
369 S.E.2d 870, 875 (W. Va. 1988) (stating that bite mark evidence is sufficiently
reliable to be admitted without a hearing on its reliability); Seivewright v. State, 7 P.3d
24, 30 (Wyo. 2000). 

















   
    











   
  
  
when the child dies from a lack of oxygen is notoriously difficult.221 
Many times, intentional suffocation does not produce any external signs 
of abuse, and it is rare that a pathologist can categorically determine that 
an infant died from suffocation unless additional injuries are present.222 
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), an established medical disorder 
in which an apparently healthy infant dies suddenly and unexpectedly
and the death cannot be explained by a postmortem study, further
complicates these cases.223  The lack of certainty in these cases increases
the potential for abuse if courts admit potentially prejudicial prosecutorial 
expert testimony without an opposing defense expert view. 
   Ex parte Briggs demonstrates the necessity for defense challenges to
the admission of expert testimony on the cause of a child’s death when 
the child dies from a lack of oxygen.224  Dr. Patricia Moore, the associate
medical examiner of a Texas hospital, concluded that the death of
Brandy Del Briggs’s two-month-old son was a homicide.225  The State
charged Del Briggs with first-degree injury to a child based partially on 
Dr. Moore’s autopsy report.226  Del Briggs pleaded guilty after her
lawyer advised her that they could not afford to hire defense medical
experts for her trial.227  Four years later, a new county chief medical
examiner amended the infant’s autopsy report after failing to find signs 
221. Charles A. Phipps, Responding to Child Homicide: A Statutory Proposal, 89 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 535, 548–49 (1999). 
 222. Id.; see also Catherine L. Goldenberg, Comment, Sudden Infant Death Syndrome
as a Mask for Murder: Investigating and Prosecuting Infanticide, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 599, 
623 (1999) (noting that no single characteristic or finding is dispositive of homicide). 
 223. Goldenberg, supra note 222, at 601 (quoting DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED 
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1644–45 (27th ed. 1988)).  Autopsies cannot distinguish between 
SIDS and a homicide, and although certain findings can suggest homicide, it is difficult 
to determine the cause of death with certainty when there are no overt signs of abuse.  Id.
at 607. Additionally, these cases are further complicated by the “rule of three,” a general 
rule medical experts follow when if three or more child deaths occur in one family with
no known disease or trauma, the cause of the third and any subsequent deaths is 
considered homicide based solely on the earlier two deaths.  See State v. Ward, 138
S.W.3d 245, 257 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).  The theory essentially allows experts to classify a
child’s death as a homicide without any distinct evidence of abuse.  Id.  Further, given
the nature of the circumstances involved, medical experts cannot test this theory with 
normal research methods, and the scientific community disagrees on whether the rule of 
three is a valid theory. Id. at 270–71.  Based on these limitations, at least one appellate 
court held the rule of three inadmissible under the Daubert standard because of its 
unreliability.  Id. at 271. 
224.  187 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 
 225. Id. at 460; see also Lee et al., supra note 3 (identifying Dr. Moore as the 
medical examiner who made this conclusion). 
 226. Id. at 463.  Del Briggs’s grand jury testimony and failed polygraph examination
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of trauma.228  Based on significant evidence of a known breathing problem
and hospital tubing error, the examiner concluded that the boy’s cause of 
death was undetermined.229 Del Briggs petitioned for a writ of habeas 
corpus and elicited five experts to testify that her son’s death was not a 
homicide.230  These experts based their testimony on a review of the
child’s medical records, not scientific or medical advances, suggesting that
Del Briggs would have presented a compelling defense at trial had she 
been able to afford it.231  Because of these expert opinions and the revised 
autopsy conclusions, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted Del
Briggs’s writ of habeas corpus and vacated the judgment against her in 
2003, after she served nearly four years in prison.232
   Although Del Briggs succeeded in her postconviction challenge, 
postconviction defense challenges to erroneous cause of death
determinations do not always succeed even when the expert revises the
expert’s own conclusion after trial.  For example, in Robbins v. State, the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused to grant a new trial to a
defendant convicted of murder based on an autopsy report by Dr. Moore,
the same doctor who testified in Briggs.233  At Neal Robbins’s trial for the 
capital murder of his girlfriend’s seventeen-month-old child, Dr. Moore 
testified that the child’s death was murder by asphyxia.234  The jury
convicted Robbins, and the court sentenced him to life in prison.235 In 
2007, the county deputy chief examiner reevaluated Dr. Moore’s autopsy
findings and concluded that Dr. Moore’s observations did not support a
finding of asphyxiation, thereby amending the report to state an 
 228. Id. at 460. 
 229. Id. at 460–61. 
 230. Id. at 462–63.  These experts largely agreed that Del Briggs’s son died from 
natural causes and that hospital error likely caused the bruising identified in the autopsy
report as a sign of intentional injury. Id.
 231. Id. at 470.  In fact, the court held that Del Briggs’s counsel performed 
ineffectively, partially because he did not request a state-funded expert under Ake, and 
indicated that the trial court would have been obligated to grant such a request because 
the cause of death was “a crucial issue.”  Id. at 468.  This case thus demonstrates the 
importance of the proper application of Ake to establish cause of death in child death
cases hinging on forensic evidence.
 232. Id. at 470. 
233.  360 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). 
 234. Id. at 450.  Dr. Moore also excluded SIDS as a potential cause of death based
on the child’s age and “story.” Id.



















   
undetermined cause of death.236  Despite receiving a letter from Dr. 
Moore recanting her own opinion that the child’s death was a homicide,
the court upheld Robbins’s conviction.237  As these cases demonstrate, 
the lack of defense access to forensic experts and inability to mount 
successful challenges to invalid prosecution evidence can be costly in 
cases where the child’s cause of death is especially difficult to determine. 
D.  Expert Bias or Incompetency
In the absence of strong defense challenges, courts also fail to apply 
Daubert to screen out false or biased expert testimony from child death 
prosecutions.238  For example, in 2008, Ontario conducted an official 
judicial inquiry into charges that one of its leading performers of pediatric
autopsies and prominent expert witnesses, Dr. Charles Smith, erred in a 
number of cases and confirmed that the allegation of widespread error in 
Dr. Smith’s work was true.239  The findings demonstrate that forensic
pediatric investigations are particularly prone to mistakes if the expert 
performing them is not competent.240  As discussed above, the flawed
forensic dental work by Dr. Michael West 241 and flawed autopsy work 
by Dr. Patricia Moore in cases of child asphyxiation242 also demonstrate
 236. Id. at 453–54. 
 237. Id. at 454, 460.  The court rejected Robbins’s argument that Dr. Moore’s trial 
testimony was false, despite Dr. Moore’s recantation, because Dr. Moore could not 
conclusively exclude her original opinion as a possible cause of death and because Dr. 
Moore did not testify to false facts at trial.  Id. at 460, 462.  It therefore reversed the trial 
court’s conclusion that Robbins’s verdict was obtained by “admittedly false testimony 
that was unsupported by objective facts and pathological findings and not based on 
sufficient expertise or scientific validity.”  Id. at 460 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 238. See supra Part II.A.
 239. GOUDGE, supra note 17, at 5–6.  Justice Goudge concluded that Ontario’s 
pediatric forensic pathology system was systematically flawed because it lacked oversight and 
recommended that the province adopt strict standards to govern how forensic pathologists 
conduct child autopsies.  Id.  Justice Goudge’s recommended standards included formal 
training and certification requirements for pathologists, requirements for review of a 
child’s relevant medical records before pathologists make a cause of death determination, and 
a system for the review of autopsy findings by other medical experts.  Id.  The similarity 
between the Canadian and U.S. cases involving the prosecution of innocent individuals 
for the death of a child suggests pediatric forensic pathology in the United States may 
suffer from the same problems plaguing Ontario.  Elements common to the Canadian 
prosecutions, based on Dr. Smith’s work, and U.S. prosecutions include failure to consult 
specialists in childhood injuries or illnesses, failure to review relevant medical records, 
and bias based on the pathologist working closely with the prosecution and law 
enforcement.  Thompson et al., supra note 18. 
 240. See supra notes 163–68 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra Part IV.B.
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the danger the admission of one-sided forensic evidence can pose in 
child death cases.
Additional cases further demonstrate how incompetence by prosecutorial 
medical experts contributes to wrongful convictions when the defense 
cannot capably challenge their opinions.  In two cases in St. Petersburg,
Florida, medical examinations led by Dr. Joan Wood ruled a seven-
month-old girl’s and two-month-old boy’s deaths homicides by child
abuse.243  The prosecution for both homicides focused on the children’s
fathers: John Peel pleaded no contest to a manslaughter charge arising
from his son’s death while maintaining his innocence, and David Long
faced murder charges for his daughter’s death.244  When Dr. Jon Thogmartin
replaced Dr. Wood as county medical examiner, he reviewed both autopsy 
reports, finding no evidence supporting Dr. Wood’s conclusions.245 
Prosecutors subsequently asked a judge to vacate Peel’s conviction after
he spent four years in prison.246  The prosecution also dropped all charges
against Long.247 
As county medical examiner for eighteen years, Dr. Wood conducted 
more than 5600 autopsies and testified in hundreds of murder trials.248 
She lost her medical license after changing the cause of death determination 
in a high-profile murder, and the county closely scrutinized her past work 
after her resignation.249  Dr. Wood’s work in Long’s case most strongly 
suggests incompetence or bias; she determined that Long’s daughter died
of SBS, although four pathologists, including Dr. Thogmartin, concluded 
that the baby died of pneumonia.250  When reviewing Dr. Wood’s work in 
child homicide cases, Dr. Thogmartin concluded that Dr. Wood’s erroneous
findings were a result of a “prosecutorial bias,” a “‘go get him’ kind of
thing.”251 




 247. Id. 
 248. Andrew Meacham, Lisa McPherson Scientology Case Drove Joan Wood from 























   





   




     
 
 
   
 
Similarly, the case of Kenneth Marsh also demonstrates how costly an
erroneous conclusion by experts can be.252  In Marsh’s case, the State’s
experts conclusively ruled out accidental death as a possible explanation 
for the death of Marsh’s girlfriend’s son.253  An independent review of
the facts surrounding the child’s death led a Florida-based independent 
expert to conclude that he could not determine that child abuse caused
the boy’s death beyond a reasonable doubt or beyond a reasonable
degree of medical certainty.254  Conversely, all state witnesses, who worked
closely with law enforcement on the case, testified beyond a reasonable 
certainty to the existence of child abuse.255  The fact that an independent 
medical examiner easily reached a different conclusion from the same
data suggests prosecutorial bias may have played a role in the conclusions
formed by the State’s experts.256 
In each case, a simple review by a second forensic expert revealed
errors in how the prosecutor’s expert determined the cause of the child’s
death, reinforcing how powerfully the lack of defense access to medical
experts shortchanges criminal defendants.257  In all cases, an autopsy 
review by a qualified expert could have saved the defendants years in
prison and the stigma of the accusation of killing their own—or a loved 
one’s—child.
V. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE REQUIRES THE APPOINTMENT OF
DEFENSE EXPERTS IN CHILD DEATH CASES TO PROTECT 
THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
   The Daubert standard does not protect innocent criminal defendants 
from facing flawed, prejudicial expert testimony in child death cases.
Because the Daubert standard relies on judges to determine when scientific 
evidence is reliable enough to serve as a basis for the jury’s fact-finding,
even though judges do not have the expertise necessary to make those 
determinations, courts are admitting the “shaky” evidence the Supreme 
 252. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
253. Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 05CV1568 WQH (NLS), 2007 WL 173864,
at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2007). 
 254. See Major Development in 21 Year Old Murder Conviction, OFF. DISTRICT 
ATT’Y, COUNTY SAN DIEGO (Aug. 4, 2004), http://www.sdcda.org/files/marsh_080404.pdf. 
 255. Marsh, 2007 WL 173864, at *1. 
 256. See id. at *2. 
257. Importantly, in each case, advances in science or new evidence did not undermine
the original examiner’s autopsy findings; the findings were simply determined to be
erroneous by a later medical examiner who reviewed the same evidence as the original 
examiner. See Lee et al., supra note 3.  Defense access to experts at the time of trial thus 
could have protected the defendants by allowing them to present the shortcomings of the 
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Court anticipated Daubert might lead them to admit.258  However, the
battle of the experts the Court envisioned in Daubert, which would 
presumably protect defendants from the prejudicial effects of unreliable 
evidence, has not materialized because of the widespread lack of defense
access to forensic experts and the defense bar’s corresponding inability
to mount successful attacks on unreliable prosecutorial expert testimony.259 
The Daubert standard’s reliance on the presentation of defense evidence
to “safeguard” defendants thus makes the assistance of a defense expert
to help develop and present that evidence a necessary and “basic tool[] 
of an adequate defense or appeal”260 when the prosecution relies on 
forensic evidence to form its case.  This is especially true in child death
cases where the prosecution relies on an expert’s conclusion about the
cause of the child’s death to establish its case.261  Because the Due Process
Clause requires the Government to provide tools to indigent defendants 
who cannot afford them, the Constitution mandates that the State provide
for the appointment of defense experts for indigent defendants in these 
child death cases.262 
 258. See supra Part II. 
 259. See supra Part II.C. In theory, the defense’s ability to attack a forensic expert’s
credibility on cross-examination and to present its own expert evidence undermining the 
prosecution’s “shaky” expert evidence would be sufficient to protect prosecutorial expert 
testimony from unfairly prejudicing the jury’s decision, but as Lee Richard Goebes 
deduced, “Absent the adversarial testing assumed by Daubert, the Daubert standard 
collapses and fails.  The prosecution, supported by state-sponsored expert witnesses, is 
able to present the trial court with a one-sided case for admission.”  Goebes, supra note 
41, at 40.  For a discussion of how a true battle of the experts involving fully developed 
expert testimony from both the prosecution and the defense increases a jury’s truth-
seeking ability in the context of forensic evidence, see Imwinkelried, supra note 173, at 
199–200; see also Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA 
Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13, 70 (2001) (concluding that a battle of the experts would 
have revealed weaknesses in proffered prosecution expert testimony on fingerprinting if 
defendants had access to experts earlier); John Devlin, Comment, Genetics and Justice: 
An Indigent Defendant’s Right to DNA Expert Assistance, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 395, 
420 (1998) (“Although many commentators fear the expense and confusion of a ‘battle 
of the experts,’ allowing the jury to hear two adversarial opinions probably comes closest 
to producing truth in the DNA context.”). 
260. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 
404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)). 
 261. See supra Part IV. 












   
 
   











   




   The fundamental fairness three-factor balancing test the Supreme Court 
applied in Ake compels this result.263  In the narrow scenario of child death 
cases in which the defendant demonstrates that the cause of the child’s
death will be a significant factor at trial, the three factors are similar to 
the factors in Ake, in which the defendant demonstrated that his mental 
state at the time of the offense would be a significant factor at trial.264  In
both cases, the defendant’s “private interest in the accuracy of a criminal 
proceeding that places” the defendant’s “life or liberty at risk is almost
uniquely compelling.”265  The State’s interest that will be affected if it must
provide defendants with access to experts is also the same; although its 
economic concerns weigh against recognizing the right to assistance, the 
State’s competing interest in fair and accurate criminal adjudications
tempers that concern.266  Lastly, in both scenarios, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of the defendant’s liberty is extremely high if the State denies
the requested assistance.267  In Ake, the potential for psychiatrists to disagree
over the defendant’s mental condition based on his symptoms meant that
a defense psychiatrist’s opinion was “crucial” to the jury’s accurate
determination of the issue of the defendant’s mental state.268  Similarly, 
here, medical experts often disagree over what a child’s symptoms indicate
about the cause of death.269 The jury can make a “sensible determination”
on the ultimate question of how the child died only if the court allows 
the defendant to present a competing opinion.270  Accordingly, in child
death cases, as in Ake, “the State’s interest in its fisc must yield,”271 and 
refusing to provide indigent criminal defendants with access to forensic
263. The three factors are (1) the private interest that will be affected by the State’s
action against the individual; (2) the governmental interest affected if the safeguard is 
provided; and (3) the probable value of substitute procedural safeguards sought and the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest affected if those safeguards are not 
provided.  Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
 264. Id. at 83. 
 265. Id. at 78. 
 266. Id. at 79.  Limiting the constitutional right to the assistance of a forensic
defense expert to child death cases in which the prosecution relies on forensic evidence 
to form its case against the defendant also limits the economic burden on the State. 
 267. Id. at 82. 
 268. Id. at 81–82. 
 269. See supra Part IV (describing cases in which forensic experts disagreed on a
child’s cause of death after reviewing the same evidence).
 270. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82. As in Ake, the risk of error from denying defendants the 
requested assistance is highest when the issue of how the child died is actually in 
question.  Id.  Accordingly, in child death cases, the defendant may be required to make 
an ex parte showing to the trial court that cause of death is likely to be a significant 
factor to have a forensic expert appointed.  See id. at 82–83.  Appointing experts only
when the defendant can make this showing will prevent the State from wasting fiscal 
resources on appointing defense experts who have no “probable value” at trial.  Id. at 82. 
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experts is fundamentally unfair, as it deprives defendants of the integral 
material of an effective defense.272  Ensuring that indigent defendants
have the necessary tool of expert assistance to build their defenses will
prevent wrongful convictions based on flawed evidence from occurring.273 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In sum, under due process jurisprudence following Ake v. Oklahoma, 
state appointment of defense expert witnesses to indigent defendants is 
constitutionally required in child death cases that rely on forensic
evidence.274  Therefore, the Supreme Court should explicitly recognize
that its reasoning in Ake equally applies to child death cases so that trial
courts do not have the discretion to reject defense requests for forensic 
experts.275  Recognizing that defense experts are a fundamental tool to
an adequate defense in child death cases will even the playing field by
allowing both sides to present evidence to the jury on the key issue of 
cause of death.276  The jury can then make an informed decision about 
what happened in a case, rather than base its decision on one-sided 
expert testimony that may be flawed or biased.277  This result serves the
U.S. criminal justice system’s goals of providing fair trials, determining 
truth, and preventing the wrongful conviction of innocent defendants.278 
If American society still accepts that “it is better that ten guilty persons 
escape, than that one innocent suffer,”279 our justice system cannot 
afford to leave indigent defendants in child death cases unprotected from
the flawed or unreliable one-sided forensic evidence currently admitted 
to form the basis of their convictions. 
 272. Id. at 77. 
 273. See supra Part IV. 
 274.  See supra Part V. 
 275.  See supra Part III.C. 
 276.  See supra Part II. 
 277.  See supra Part II. 
 278.  See supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text. 
 279.  BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *352. 
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